United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1977
United States v. Board of Commissioners of
Sheffield, Alabama
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
U.S. v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 50. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.
MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Nancy December 2, 1977 
RE: No. 76-1662, U.S. v. Board of Comm'rs (~) 
I have read Justice Brennan's opinion. In general, 
it is a fine opinion and I have no doubt that it is correct. 
Ultimately, I think you should join. 
In the meantime, however, and before you join, I 
think certain problems should be worked out. I can communi-
cate the minor suggestions, some of which are noted in the 
margins, to Dave Carpenter. My major objections also are 
noted in the margins, xa although not explained fully. 
~ The biggest problem, and one that is critical, is the text 
at 14-19. The basis point, as I have scribbled on the back 
of p. 14, is that when a state or a political subdivision 
is covered, every unit within that state or political 
).-
subdivision is covered, and must comply with the preclearance - ~---- ...., ,.__, 
requirements of § 5. This is true whether the designated 
unit is the state or the political subdivision. Thus if 
an entire state is designated, each ~~ political subdivision 
within it and each other political unit within iRR it is 
covered. The legislative history makes clear that when a 
state is designated, every political subdivision within it 
2. 
is covered. Since the political subdivision itself has not 
~ot>S t/btS/ 
been designated, and since it n ot conduct registration, 
it is apparent that its qualification as a "political 
subdivision" for designation purposes is .tke:xxa:ma: irrelevant 
~ 
to its coverage x once the whole state is designated, there 
is no reason for treating a city or other political unit 
differently from a political subdivision for coverage 
purposes. 
The opinion goes through five pages of analysis on 
this point, with emphasis on the theme of coverage of 
covera~e of 
terrmtories within a designated area rather than/ unctional 
political units that could be designated, in order to ... ........ .. 
rebut what was going to be JPS' position in dissent. Dave 
Carpenter tells me that JPS was going to argue .tka:.t --
designated, 
if I have this straight-- that when a whole state is/£sxe:xe:~ 
the only units that are covered are political subdivisions. 
purposes with the relevant unit for 
This theory confuses the relevant unit for designation/~ 
coverage purposes. I gather, however, that JPS has 
abandoned this position. Thus the opinion's lengthy 
treatment of the theory is unnecessary, and confusing without 
the presence of a dissent that takes that position. 
The point still could be made, but I think it should 
be shortened and made clearer. Dave would rather take it 
out completely. I would like to consider it further over 
the weekend and then either propose a substitution for you 
or see whether the section is changed or omitted in the next 
circulated draft. 
Nancy 
.§u:pumt <!Jaurt af t4t ~ni:ttb .§tatt£> 
~aa!p:ngtan.lO. <!J. :Wg7J1.2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
December 1, 1977 
Re: No. 76-1662 - United States v. Board of 
Commissioners of Sheffield 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to Conference 
. . 
I 
.iuprtutt Qf!turl llf Urt 'Jinittb ~bdtg 
Jfag!ringhm. ~. <q. 2llgtJl.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
December 2, 1977 
Re: 76-1662 u.s. v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield 
Dear Bill: 
In due course, a dissent will be forthcoming on 
behalf of Bill Rehnquist, John and yours truly. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
.$>upumt <!}lllttt of ±4.t '!.'lttittlt ~t"ltt.$. 
Jll~ulft"ingtcn. ~. <If. 20'giJ~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
December 1, 1977 
Re: No. 76-1662, United States v. Sheffield 
Board of Comm'rs. 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
.§tt:Vrtmt <!fcu.rt of tqt 'Pitfub ~tafts 
1Uasftington. In. <!f. 20,5't~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
November 30, 1977 V .JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
Re: No. 76-1662, United States v. Board of Commissioners of 
Sheffield, Alabama 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
.§up-uuw <!fottrl of tlp~ ~mult ~g 
~trrulltittgtctt. 18. <q:. 2.(1~)1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE H/\RRY A. BLACKM UN 
Re: No. 76-1662 
Dear Bill: 
Rochester, Minnesota 
Decembe r 12, 1977 
U.S. v. Board of Commissioners 
of Sheffield, Alabama 
Please JOln me . I am writing a two-sentence con-
currence which will be around shortly. 
Because, however, of my solemn pledge to Henry 
Putzel, jr., and because of my compact with the shade of Noah 
Webster , my joinder is expressly conditioned upon the elimi-
nation of 11 tha t w ord 11 in the 8th line of note 26 on page 25. As 
they have always said out here in Bloomer , Wisconsin, 11 para-
meter don 1t mean boundary. 11 Please? 
Sincerely, 
H. A. B . 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
No. 76-1662 
United States, Appellant, ) On Appeal from the United 
v. States District Court for 
Board of Commissioners of Shef- the Northern District of 
field, Alabama, et al., Appellees. Alabama. 
'[January -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
Given the Court's reading of the Voting Rights Act in prior 
decisions, and particularly in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 
393 U. S. 544 (1969), and Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 
(1971), I concur in the judgment of the Court. In addition, 
I concur in Part III of the Court's opinion. 
Although my reservations as to the constitutionality of the 
Act have not abated, -x· I believe today's decision to be correct 
under this Court's precedents and necessary in order to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act, as construed in Allen and 
Perkins. In view of these purposes it does not make sense 
to limit the preclearance requirement to ~ political units 
charged with voter registration. As the majority observes, 
ante, at 13, such a construction of the statute could enable 
covered States or political subdivisions to delegate responsi-
bility for changing the electoral process to local entities that 
do not conduct voter registration. A covered State or politi-
cal subdivision thereby could achieve through its instrumen-
talities what it could not rio itself without preclearance. 
I agree with the Court that a more sensible construction of 
§ 5, in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose. is to 
treat the governmental units responsible for changes in the 
·x·soc Allen v. State Board of Elections. supra, at 595 (Black, J .. dissent-




2 UNITED STATES v. SHEFFIELD BOARD OF COMM'RS 
electoral process within a designated State or political sub-
division as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision .. 
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding, 
cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State 
would imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In 
such a situation, the reason for including the political sub~. 
divisions is not that they are defined in § 14 (c) ( 2) and there-
fore might have been designated separately. Their eligibility 
for designation apart from the State is without significance 
once the entire State has been designated. Rather, the politi-
cal subdivisions are covered because they are within the juris-
diction of the designated unit and might be delegated its 
authority to enact or administer laws affecting voting. 
Because the same is true of a governmental unit like the city 
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the 
meaning of § 14 (c) (2) , I agree with the Court that it too is 
subject to § 5 and must comply with its requirements . 
~DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA1m 
No. 76-1662 
United States, Appellant, ) On Appeal from the United 
v. States District Court for 
Board of Commissioners of Shef- the Northern District of 
field, Alabama, et al., Appellees. Alabama. 
!(January -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
Given the Court's reading of the Voting Rights Act in prior 
decisions. and particularly in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 
393 U. S. 544 (1969), and Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 
( 1971), I concur in the juclgment of tho Court. In addition, 
I concur in Part III of the Court's opinion. 
Although my reservations as to the constitutionality of tho 
Act have not abated,* I believe today's decision to be correct 
under this Court's precedents and necessary in order to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act, as construed in Allen and 
Perkins. In view of these purposes it does not make sense 
to limit the preclearance requirement to ~ political units 
charged with voter registration. As the majority observes, 
ante, at 13, such a construction of tho statute could enable 
covered States or political subdivisions to Q.e~ate 1 es]'ls~si ­
~ility f o r ch anE!il~!li t"Rs slEHltSP&l t'l 68@{:18 ts local entities that 
do not conduct voter registration. A coverrd State or politi-
cal subdivision thereby could achieve through its instrumen-
talities what it could not do itself without preclearance. 
I agree with the Court that a more sensible construction OT 
§ 5, in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose. is to 
treat the governmental units responsible for changes in the 
·X·See Allen v. Statr Board of Elections. supra, nt 50.'5 (l3lnck, .T.. diRsent-
ing) ; Georgia v. U.S. , 411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (PowEr-r., J., di:.;scnting) . 
bf ~ste.'~ 
d 3o '1r 
~allow 
~ Cl~~o me ft~fo~t~ibil; 
.f.r ch '" Jii\J tl.t. 
elu.hrtAI rro c.e~S 
. ~
76-1662-CONCUR (A) 
2 UNITED STATES v. SHEFFIELD BOARD OF COMM'RS 
electoral process within a designated State or political sub-
division as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision. 
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding, 
cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State 
would imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In 
such a situation, the reason for including the political sub-
divisions is not that they are defined in § 14 (c) (2) and there-
fore might have been designated separately. Their eligibility 
for designation apart from the State is without significance 
once the entire State has been designated. Rather, the politi-
cal subdivisions are covered because they are within the juris-
diction of the designated unit and might be delegated its 
authority to enact or administer laws affecting voting. 
Because the same is true of a governmental unit like the city 
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the 
meaning of§ 14 (c)(2), I agree with the Court that it too is 
subject to § 5 and must comply with its requirements . 
·I 
6 9 
Mr. Justice Powell, 
There is a docket sheet to match this 
case inside the binder cover of the Docket 






June 16, 1977 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 76~1662 
UNITED STATES, Movant 
v. 
BD. OF COMM'~S OF 
Motion to Expedite 
Consideration of 
Jurisdictional Statement 
( .....___ SHEFFIELD, ALA. 
SUMMARY; The SG asks the Court to expedite consideration of the 
government's appeal from the decision of a three-judge USDC (ND Ala.) 
(Rives, Grooms, McFadden} that cities (and other political units of 
a state} which have elections but do not conduct their own voter 
registration are exempt from §5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
FACTS: In essen-;;-§; .. requ~th~ whenever ... a coveredY "State 
of political subdivision'' seeks to change any voting procedure, it 
must first :;5eek preclearance from the u.s. AG, who has 60 days to 
object (or it may seek preclearance from the USDC D.C.). Section 
14(c) (2) of the Act defines "political subdivision" as any county, 
parish, or other subdivision of a state which conducts registration 
for voting, 
( '-. :/States or political subdivisions are covered by the Act (§4) if they 
maintained any test or device for voting on November 1, 1964, as certi-
fied by the AG, and if the Director of the Census determines that less 
than 50% of the eligible persons either registered or voted that year. 
. ' 
- 2 -
In 1965, Alabama was designated a state covered by the Act. 
On March 20, 1975, the city of Sheffield asked the AG for preclearance 
of its proposal to hold a referendum on changing its commission form 
of government to a mayor-council form. However, on May 13, 1975, 
before the AG's 60 days had expired, the referendum was held and 
the change approved. On May 23, 1975, the AG advised that he had no 
objection to the referendum, but that this "does not bar subsequent 
judicial action to enjoin enforcement of the change," and that it 
would also be ''subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5." 
Subsequently, the city requested preclearance. In July, 1976, 
the AG advised that he objected to the new procedure of electing 
councilmen at-large, rather ~ than by ward, because he believed it 
would have a racially discriminatory effect. Nevertheless, the city 
scheduled its at-large election for August 10, 1976. 
( '-.._/" 
On August 9, 1976, the AG sought to enjoin the election and 
implementation of the change until federal preclearance was obtained. 
The DC dismissed the complqint and denied reconsideration. 
DECISIONS OF DC; The DC unanimously held that even when an 
entire state is covered, §5 applies only to its political subdivisions 
which satisfy the definition in the Act, and does not apply to cities, - - ~ 
such as Sheffield, which do not conduct voter registration. Accordingly, 
the city was not required to obtain preclearance. 
Alternatively, two judges of the DC (Judge Rives disagreed) held 
that by approving the referendum, the AG also approved the change to 
at-large election ''notwithstanding his caution to the city that the 
change was also subject to preclearance." This was so either because 
( '-' 
the prior approval contained implicit approval of the at~large election 
or because it exhausted the AG's authority under the Act, Judge Rives 
believed that the AG had preserved his right to later object to the 
at-large method of election. 
' . 
- 3 -
In its opinion denying rehearing, the unanimous DC expressly 
rejected the government's argument that §5 applies to all political 
units (regardless of whether they conduct registration) in a state 
which has been designated as covered by the Act. 
SG'S CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS: The SG argues that the DC's 
holding is based on a literal reading of §5, and is inconsistent with 
the Act's structure, original legislative history, consistent inter-
pretation by the AG since 1965, and congressional endorsement thereof 
when the Act was extended and amended in 1970 and 1975. The only 
purpose of the definition of "political subdivision" is to trigger 
determination of coverage by the AG and Census Director under §4, 
and not to exclude cities within covered states or political sub-
divisions from the scope of §5. The SG argues that the designation 
of a state or political subdivision as covered by the Act constitutes 
("--' a designation of all voting units within it, and that the contrary 
holding below is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. 
) The SG also alleges a conflict with other three-judge courts, 
and notes that because of this case, three school districts in 
Texas have notified the AG that they would not heed his objections 
to changes in their voting procedures. 
Regarding the majority's alternative holding, the SG argues that 
the entire plan was not before the AG when he approved the referendum. 
CONTENTION ON THE MOTION: The SG asks the Court either to 
summarily reverse or to note probable jurisdiction this term because 
the decision below has engendered substantial confusion as to the 
coverage of §5. 
' 
( "---· 
DISCUSSION: The DC majority's alternative holding seems incorrect 
on the facts, particularly in light of language in §5 that the AG's 
7 failure to object will not "bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforce-
j T ' 
Court Voted on . ................. , 19 . . . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 76-1 662 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
UNITED STATES 
vs. 
BD . OF COMM'RS . OF SHEFFIELD, ALA. 
Motion to Expedite Consideration of Jurisdictional Statement. 
MERITS MOTION HOLD CERT. 
JURISDICTIONAL 
STATEMF.N'lc ABSENT NOT VOTING 
FOR 
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF· G D 
Stevens, J ..................... . . . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Marshall, J ............ . 
White, J ............... . 
Stewart, J ............. . 
Brennan, J.............. . . . ............. . 








June 16, 1977 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 76-1662 
UNITED STATES, Movant 
v. 
BD, OF C0tf.J11 RS OF 
SHEFFIELD r ALA, 
Response to Motion to 
Expedite Consideration 
of Jurisdictional Statement 
RESP'S CONTENTIONS: At the Court's request, resp has filed an 
answer st~ting that it does not object to expedited consideration of 
the appeal provided it is allowed adequate time to file a motion to 
dismiss or affirm. ~esp is ~ttempting to file such a motion by 
June 20, However, if, due to the shortness of time, resp cannot do 
so, the Court is asked to deny the motion. Resp points out that it 
did not know until June 9, that a response to the JS was due on 




DISCUSSION: Although it would be preferable to see the 
response before the Court acts, if it is not filed by June 20 
and if June 23 is to be the final conference, the Court probably 
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Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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BD. OF COMM'RS. OF SHEFFIELD, ALA. 
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Rehnquist, J ................. . 
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Stewart, J ............. . 
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June 23, 1977 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 76-1662 ATX 
UNITED STATES 
from USDC (ND Ala.) 
Grooms, McFadden) 
A..:,.o ~F COMM 1 RS OF 
1 
,-n. . SHEFFIELD, ALABAMA Federal/Civil Timely 
{). ~ SUMMARY: 
~ reverse the decision of the three-judge USDC that cities (and other 
.· 
The SG asks ·the Court to note jurisdiction or summarily 
fl'k \ political units of a state) which have elections but do not conduct 
their own vo~~is~a~on are e~mpt from §5 of the Voting Righ~s 
Act, -
FACTS, DECISIONS AND SG'S CONTENTIONS: These items are set out 
in my memorandum on the motion to expedite (attached) • ~ 
APPELLEES' CONTENTIONS: Appellees have filed a motion to affirm 
in which they argue that because voter registration in Alabama is 
conducted by counties, cities such as Sheffield are not included 
- 2 -
within the plain meaning of the definition of "political subdivision" 
(§14(c) (2)), which limits the scope of the Act. Thus, affirmance 
is required by the plcinmeaning rule. 
If, despite the rule, resort is had to the legislative history, 
appellees argue that it only confirms their statutory language argu-
ment, They quote from the legislative history that the term "'politica= 
subdivision' is not intended to encompass precincts, election districts 
or other similar units when they are within a county or parish which 
supervises registration for voting." They also cite testimony before 
the House subcommittee considering an earlier Dept. of Justice bill 
in which AG Katzenbach stated that "the whole bill really is aimed 
at getting people registered," and that political subdivision means 
''that area for which people are registered and within which a registrar 
board operates. It is called different names in different states." 
He also stated he was aware how voter registration was accomplished 
in Alabama, Appellees argue that Senator Talmadge's statement that 
the Act would cover Georgia's cities (JS 12-13) does not undercut 
th.eir position because at that time voter registration in Georgia 
was conducted by cities. 
~ · 
Appellees also argue ' that the subsequent re-enactments of the 
Act do not constitute congressional approval of the AG's consistent 
interpretation because such a rule of statutory construction is only 
an aid in resolving ambiguous language, 
Regarding the holding of the majority below that the AG had in 
~act approved the change to at-large elections when he failed to 
object to the referendum on changing to a mayor-council form of 
government, appellees claim that the AG was aware at the time he 
approved the referendum that Alabama law would mandate at-large 
election because of Sheffield~s size. ~ppellees also assert that they 
- 3 -
did not believe the Act applied, but sought the AG's approval out of 
an abundance of caution, and so stated in their letter to him. 
Finally, appellees contend there is no conflict because the 
defense raised in this case was not asserted in those cited by the 
SG. 
DISCUSSION: The exclusion from the Voting Rights Act of cities 
and other non-registering political units creates a loophole which 
could be used to defeat the purpose of the Act, and therefore the 
question whether the loophole was created by the court below or by 
Congress is note-worthy. However, because the plan language appears 
to support the holding of the court below, summary reversal would 
not seem to be appropriate. 
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List 1, Sheet 3 
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~political subdivision'' seeks to change any voting procedure, it 
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object (or it may seek preclearance from the USDC D.C.). Section 
14(c) (2) of the Act defines "political subdivision" as any county, -
parish, or other subdivision of a state which conducts registration 
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:/States or political subdivisions are covered by the Act (§4) if they 
maint~ined any test or device for voting on Nove~ber 1, 1964, as certi-
fied by the AG, and if the Director of the Census determines that less 




In 1965, Alabama was designated a state covered by the Act. 
On March 20, 1975, the city of Sheffield asked the AG for preclearance 
of its proposal to hold a referendum on changing its commission form 
of government to a mayor-council form. However, on May 13, 1975, 
before the AG's 60 days had expired, the referendum was he~d and 
the change approved. On May 23, 19~~A~ he had no 
1\ 
objection to the referendum, but that this "does not bar subsequent 
judicial action to enjoin enforcement of the change," and that it 
would also be "subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5." 
Subsequently, the city requested preclearance. In July, 1976, 
the AG advised that he objected to the new procedure of electing 
councilmen at-large, rather than by ward, because he believed it 
would have a racially discriminatory effect. Nevertheless, the city 
scheduled its at-large election for August 10, 1976. 
On August 9, 1976, the AG sought to enjoin the election and 
implementation of the change until federal preclearance was obtained. 
The DC dismissed the complaint and denied reconsideration. 
DECISIONS OF DC: The DC unanimously held that even when an 
entire state is covered, §5 · applies only to its political subdivisions 
which satisfy the definition in the Act, and does not apply to cities, 
such as Sheffield, which do not condu~t voter registration. According!~ 
the city was not required to obtain preclearance. 
Alternatively, two judges of the DC {Judge Rives disagreed) held 
that by approving the referendum, the AG also approved the change to 
at-large election "notwithstanding his caution to the city that the 
change was also subject to preclearance." This was so either because 
the prior approval contained implicit approval of the at~large election 
or because it exhausted the AG's authority under the Act, Judge Rives 
believed that . the AG had preserved his right to later object to the · 





In its opinion denying rehearing, the unanimous DC expressly 
rejected the government's argument that §5 app~ies to all political 
units (regardless of whether they conduct registration) in a state 
which has been designated as covered by the Act. 
SG'S CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS: The SG argues that the DC's 
holding is based on a literal reading of §5, and is inconsistent with 
the Act's structure, original legislative history, consistent inter-
pretation by the AG since 1965, and congressional endorsement thereof 
when the Act was extended and amended in 1970 and 1975. The only 
purpose of the definition of "political subdivision" is to trigger 
determination of coverage by the AG and Census Director under §4, 
and not to exclude cities within covered states or political sub-
divisions from the scope of §5. The SG argues that the designation 
of a state or political subdivision as covered by the Act constitutes 
a designation of all voting units within it, and that the contrary 
holding below is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. 
The SG also alleges a conflict with other three-judge courts, 
and notes that because of this case, three school districts in 
Texas have notified the AG that they w~uld not heed his objections 
to changes in their voting ' p~ocedures. 
Regarding the majority's alternative holding, the SG argues that 
the entire plan was not before the AG when he approved the referendum. 
CONTENTION ON THE MOTION: The SG asks the Court either to 
note probable jurisdiction this term because 
the decision below has engendered substantial confusion as to the 
coverage of §5. 
DISCUSSION: The DC majority's alternative holding seems incorrect 
~on the facts, particularly in light of language in §5 that the AG's 
failure to object will not "bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforce-
• 
- 4 -
ment." Moreover, since the city held the referendum b e fore the AG's 
time for objection had expired~ his subsequent approval of the 
referendum should not in any event estop him from further action. 
Thus, the statutory question cannot be avoided, and the case 
appears to be a likely note because of the importance of the issue. 
However, since the DC's holding is supported by the literal language 
of §5, summary reversal would not appear appropriate. J~ 
Nevertheless, the issue apparently affects a large number of 
voting units in the country, and should be settled as soon as possible. 
Noting probable jurisdiction before recess would allow briefing this 
summer and an early argument; similarly, affirming now would settle 
the question. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to grant the 
7 motion to expedite, and set the case for consideration at the June 23, 
( 1977 Conference. _ Alt~ough the response to the JS is not due until 
June 24, an earlier response could be called for. 
There is no response to the motion. 
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1. SUMMARY: A Georgia election law was amended to 
stagger the terms of a three person board of county commissioners, 
without being submitted for approval under §5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. At appellants' instance, a three-judge 
district court enjoined future elections under the law as 
amended until approval was gained, but it refused to set aside 
'--~~------- -----------------a recent election under it or to order that the next election, 
------------------------------- ~ ----to be held in 1978, would be for unstaggered terms if approval 
was not gained by then. Appellant complains of the refusal to 
grant the latter forms of relief. 
C .
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2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Under a 1964 Georgia 
statute applicable only to Peach County, the county board of 
commissioners of roads and revenues is composed of three 
commissioners elected by the county at large . One commissioner 
must reside in a named city in the county, one outside the 
city and within the county, and one may reside anywhere in the 
county. These seats are denominated Posts 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. 
Under the 1964 statute, all three posts carried four-year 
terms. Elections for the three posts were held in 1964 and 
were due to be held again in 1968. Before the 1968 elections, 
the 1964 statute was amended to provide that the 1968 election 
to Post 3 would be for a two-year term and that thereafter, the 
post again would carry a four-year term. The effect of the 
amendment thus was to stagger the terms of the commissioners: 
------...:..::-
Post 3 would stand for election in 1970, Posts 1 and 2 in 1972, 
Post 3 in 1974, and Posts 1 and 2 in 1976. 
The 1976 primary election for Posts 1 and 2 was scheduled 
for August 10. On August 6, appellants filed a class action 
complaint in the Middle District of Georgia against the three 
county commissioners and the judge of the county probate court, 
individually and in their official capacities, alleging that the 
1968 amendment constituted a change in voting standards, 
practices, and procedures for which no judicial or administrative 
approval has been obtained, in violation of §5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 4.2 U.S.C. §1973c. The complaint 
sought convening of a three-judge court under 42 U.S.C. §1973c 
and the grant of declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellants 
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also moved for a preliminary injunction against proceeding with 
the primary and general elections. 
On August 9 the originating judge denied a preliminary 
injunction, refusing to hold a hearing on it because he "seriously 
question[ed]" whether the 1968 amendment was a "change" required 
to be approved under the Voting Rights Act. The primary was 
held, and appellants renewed their request for an injunction 
against holding the general election. Sometime after the initial 
denial of the preliminary injunction, appellants filed an answer 
denying that the 1968 amendment was a change under the Voting 
Rights Act. The district court took no fu~ther action until 
after the November general election was held. 
After that election, a three-judge court was convened. On 
February 2, 1977, appellees filed a brief conceding that tbe lJ68 
amendment was a change cover~d by the Voting . R~hts Act and 
that it could not be used in future elections unless it was cleared 
through one of that Act's procedures. On February 28, 1977, the 
three-judge court ordered that appellees be 
enjoined from further using and enforcing in any 
respect so much of [the amendment] , which [sic] 
relates to the election of the Peach County Board 
of Commissioners unless and until the provisions 
of section five of the Voting Ri~~ts Act of 1965, 
as amended, ... have been compjWed with. This 
injunction shall continue until those requirements 
have been complied with and shall not otherwise be 
dissolved. 
The court, relying on Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 u.s. 
544 (1969), denied appellants' request that the 1976 elections 
be set aside and new ones ordered, however: 
Given the rather technical changes made in the 
county's election law by the 1968 amendment and, 
more important, the apparent ~a~& o!_~ di§-
criminatory purpose or effect surrounding the use 
---------------~-~--~~--~--~~------~-------------------~ -~ 
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of the law in the 1976 elections, the court 
denies this request and will give this order 
only prospective relief [sic] . 
On March 23, 1977 appellants moved under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
60(b) (6) for reconsideration of the district court's refusal 
to set aside the election or, in the alternative, for modification 
of the order to provide that if the amendment was not cleared 
through the Voting Rights Act before the 1978 elections, all 
three seats would be declared open in that election. The court 
denied the motion for reconsidera·tion or m~dification on April 26, 
1977, stating that it was without jurisdiction because the case 
had been appealed to this court and that it saw no reason to 
reconsider. Apparently in response to the request for 
modification of the order, the court stated, "The problem of 
relief is a question for a single-judge court." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellants contend that the three-judge 
court misapplied Allen and abused its discretion in refusing 
to set aside the 1976 elections or to declare all three posts 
open for the 1978 elections unless the change was approved 
under the Voting Rights Act. They also argue that the court erred 
in referring to the "apparent lack of discriminatory purpose 
or effect surrounding the use of the law in the 1976 elections" 
in refusing to set aside those elections; and that if dis-
criminatory purpose or effect should be considered in deciding 
whether to set aside an election, the court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue. They contend ·that the change 
to ~taggered terms might disadvantage blacks because "white 
voters might be more likely to vote for a black candidate if he 
or she is one of three candidate3 than if the black candidate is 
c 
5 -
running for the only position open." 
Appellees move to affirm on the grounds that the three-
judge court acted in compliance with Allen and did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the elections or to order 
elections for all three seats in 1978; and that under Beer v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), the court did not have the 
power to take any action with respect to .the two posts, the terms 
of which were not affected by the 1968 amendment. 
4. DISCUSSION: (A) Refusal to set aside elections: 
This Court twice has refused to set aside elections thatmok 
---------------------'--~---------~~,-----------------~---'~ place under changes in voting laws that had not been cleared 
through the Voting Rights Act procedures. In Allen v. State Board 
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1960), the Court held that certain 
changes in Mississippi voting laws should have been submitted 
for approval under Section 5, but refused to set aside elections 
held pursuant to the changes: 
These §5 coverage questions involve complex 
issues of first impression -- issues subject 
to rational disagreement. The state enactments 
were not so clearly subject to §5 that the 
appellees' failure to submit them for approval 
constituted deliberate defiance of the Act. 
Moreover, the discriminatory purpose or effect 
of these statutes, if any, has not been determined 
by any court. We give only prospective effect 
to our decision, bearing in mind that our judg-
ment today does not end the matter so far as 
these States are concerned. 
Id. at 572. In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971), the 
Court held that changes in voting practices in Canton, Mississippi . 
were covered by the Act, but again refused to order the election 
set aside, remanding to the district court for that decision. 
~ The Court stated that Allen had refused to overturn the elections 
there "primarily because the scope of §5 coverage was then an 
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issue of first impression and 'su?ject to rational disagreement,' " 
400 U.S. at 395, and that this reason did not apply in Perkins 
because the elections there were held after Allen was decided. 
The Court nonetheless found that the desirability of effective 
enforcement of §5 was not the only factor to be considered 
in fashioning a remedy for failure to submit a change for 
approval: 
[O]ther factors may be relevant, such as the nature 
of the changes complained of, and whether it was 
reasonably clear at the time of the election that 
the changes were covered by §5. In certain 
circumstances, for example, it might be appropriate 
to enter an order affording local officials an 
opportunity to seek federal approval and ordering 
a new election only if local officials fail to do so 
or if the required federal approval is not forth-
corning. Since the District Court is more familiar 
with the nuances of the local situation than are we, 
and has heard the evidence in this case, we think 
the question of the appropriate remedy is for that 
court to determine, in the first instance, after 
hearing the views of both parties. 
400 U.S., at 396-97. 
Thus, · the Court in Allen and Perkins tentatively has 
!identified at least three factors to be considered in deciding whether to order so-called retroactive relief: (1) whether the 
changes in voting procedures clearly were subject to §5 approval; 
(2) the "nature of the changeS complained of;" and (3) whether 
the changes have been determined to have a discriminatory purpose 
or effect. In this case, appellees' concession below that the 
change was covered by §5 seems to suggest there was little 
question on that point, although the district court initially 
showed some uncertainty and the change apparently went 
unchallenged for eight years. As to the nature of the change, 
it is one that can be adopted for sound reasons. 
~~ 
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As to discriminatory purpose or effect, the court below 
noted that the change did not seem on its face to have such 
purpose or effect, although appellants would dispute this. As 
appellants note, there is tension between the lower court's 
reference to this factor, and this Court's holdings that a 
three-judge court convened to decide whether a change is covered 
by §5 should not delve into discriminatory purpose and effect~ 
~' United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 
45 U.S.L.W. 3564 (1977). The Court's mention of this factor 
in its discussion of remedy in Allen, however, seems to invite 
such consideration. It is unclear whether the factor should be 
considered even in relation to remedy after Warren County, 
and whether the lower court in this case placed any significant 
weight on the factor. If the factor should be considered in 
determining whether to set asioe an election, appellants may 
have a point that an evidentiary hearing should be held on the 
1ssue. 
Appellee's reliance on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 
(1976) for the proposition that the three-judge court could not 
take any action with respect to the two posts the terms of which 
were not affected by the 1968 amendment is quest ionable. In 
Beer a redistricting of the seats chosen by distr ict for the 
New Orleans city council left unaffected two at-large seats 
that were established before enactment of the Voting Rights Act. 
In the city's §5 suit for a declaratory judgment that the 
changes would not have a discriminatory effect, the district court 
held that the city's failure to eliminate the at-large seats did 
not meet the §5 test. On appeal the United States conceded, and 
- 8 -
this Court held, that the redistricting plan could not be 
rejected solelybecause it did not eliminate the at-large seats, 
bec~e, "The at-large seats, having existed without change 
since 1954, were not subject to review in this proceeding 
under §5." 425 U.S., at 139. 
Appellees argue that this case is like Beer, because 
two seats were not affected by the change in the term of the 
third. Beer could be distinguished, though, because there any 
potential for discriminatory effect resulting from the existence 
of the at-large seats antedated and existed independently from 
the districting changes made after the Voting Rights Act was 
enacted; while here, the potential for discriminatory effect 
came about only upon the change in the term of Post 3 and may 
effect elections for all three posts. That is, the change to 
staggered terms might properly be viewed as a "change" in the 
procedures for elections for all three posts. 
(B) Refusal to order elections for all three posts in 1978 
if §5 approval of the change is not gained: It is unclear 
whether appellants requested this relief from the three-judge 
court before entry of its order, and that court may have 
considered itself without power to modify its order later. Also, 
that court's cryptic comment in denying the motion for 
modification that the matter of remedy was for a single judge 
can be read as inviting appellants to return in 1978 to request 
this form of enforcement of the injunction if the change is not 
approved by then. Alternatively, the injunction may prevent 
elections for any posts until the change is approved. 
- 9 -
The short of this case may be that after the change 
to staggered terms had been in effect for eight years, appellants 
went to court four days before the primary and failed to 
convince the court to enjoin the elections. After the elections, 
the three-judge court properly enjoined future elections under 
the changed statute until it is approved under §5; but it 
exercised its discretion not to set aside the elections, and its 
prudence in not spelling out what would happen in 1978 if the 
change was not approved by then. Although the law is not entirely 
clear on what remedy should be granted in this situation ~~~d~----
what factors should be taken into account, I do not think a 
summary affirmance would be inconsistent with the Court's 
previous statements and actions. 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. l..,u·~. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("Act"), 79 Stat. + ~ I ~ • 
439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V)/ J ~;t; ... Q. 
In pertinent parts, it provides: J ~ 
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which t.he pro- rc  
bitions set forth in [§4 (a) of the Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 ~ .,._£4.#12,1,~ 
U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (1970 ed. Supp. V)l based upon determinations made • ~ T~ t 
under the first sentence of [§ 4 (b) of the Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, ~
42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (b) (1970 ed. Supp. V)] are in effect shall enact o  ,g.£~1£$ 
seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from tha ~ .,.,......_.. k 
in force or in effect on November l, 1964 ... such State or subdivision ul. ~ . A 
may institute an action in the United States District Court for the Dis- r.._ v-o- c.~•l.twy 
trict of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, a.J ~ ~ 
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not. have the purpose """I ,....., J. ~ 
and will not have the effect of denying or abridg;ing the right to vote o~ ,; •c.J..eJ -~ 
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set _~ J-~ ~.-
forth in section 1973b (f) (2) of this title, and unless and until the court...., ~ r---"' 
enters such judgment no per~on shall be denied the right to vote for.-2,~...._ -/-
failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard , practice, ~ • 
or procedure: Provided. That such qualification, prerequisite, standard,~· r4-4 j 
or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, _ 
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the ~ ~~ 
chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or sub- , 1 .._., 4-'(.... 
division ~o the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not inter- -7' ~ ~ 
posed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good ~~~ 4 • (. ....1 l!)~t!Se· sbPwll, to facilitate an ('xpedited approval within sixty days afte1r • ., f--
a..._~ ••• o c::,.,w...J~···-f. .... ~·'l ~~ 
#ll....., --~·· 4..~ - -J.e cb ~ ,._ -"*~ • y 
~~~~~4..;--
Je ... ..u ... 4., ~~~~~.A. G-. 
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requires that States. like Alabama, which are covered under 
§ 4 of the Act. 79 Stat. 438, as ambended. 42 U. S. C. ~ 1973b 
(1970 ed., Supp. V) ,2 obtain prior federal approval before 
changing any voting practice or procedure that was in effect 
on November 1, 1964. The questions for decision in this case 
are (1) whether § 5 requires an Alabama city that has never 
conducted voter registration ~ to obtain preclearance of a vot-
ing change and (2) if so, whether the failure of the Attorney 
General of the United States to object to the holding of a 
referendum election at which a change is adopted constitutes 
federal approval of that change. 
I 
The City of She:ffield, Ala. (the "City" ot· "Sheffield") was 
incorporated in 1885 by the Alabama Legislature. As incor-
pora.ted, the City was governed by a mayor and eight council-
men, two councilmen being elected directly from each of 
the City's four wards. Sheffield retained this mayor-council 
government until 1912 when it adopted a system in which 
three commissioners. elected by the City at large, ran the 
City. This commission form of government was in effect in 
Sheffield on November 1, 1964. 
such submission, the Attorne~· General has affirmatively indicated that 
·such objection will not be mad<{ .]" 
2 Pursuant to th<' first ~entencc of§ 4 (b), Alabamn wa;; designated ns n. 
covered jurisdiction on August 6, 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897, it hnving been 
determined thnt Alnbama. mnintnined a "te~t or drvire" on November 1, 
1964 and that "]es,:; than 50 perc<>nt of rt110se) persons of voting age 
residing [in Alabnmn] either were regi,;tered on November 1, 1964 or voted 
in the 1964- Presidential Election. See 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (b). Because 
Alabama has not e;;tabli~hed in a judicial proceeding that the voter qualifi-
cation requirement~ had not bern used for the purpose or with tlw effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vot.e on :.H'cmmt of race, it is ubject to 
the prohibitions of§ 4 (a), ><ee 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (a), and hence to§ 5. 
8 In AlabaiJ1a. voter registration i~ conducted nt the county level by 
county boa.rds of voter registmtion, the members of which are appointed 
by certain state officials. See Code of Ala.,§ 17-4-40 (1975). 
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Sometime prior to March 20, 1975, Sheffield decided to put 
to a rflferendum the question whether the City should return 
to a mayor-council form of government.~ On that date the 
president of the Board of Com~nissioners of Sheffield wrote 
the Attorney General of the United States to "give notice of 
the proposal of submitting to the qualified voters of the City, 
whether the present commission form of government shall be 
abandoned in favor of the Mayor and Aldermanic form of 
government." 5 On May 13, 1975, before the Attorney General 
replied. the referendum opcurred, and the voters of Sheffield 
approved the change. 
On May 23 the Attorney General formally responded to 
Sheffield that he did "not interpose an objection to the holding 
of the referendum." but that "[s]ince the voters in the city of 
Sheffield elected to adopt the mayor-council form of govern-
ment on May 13, 1975, the change is also subject to the 
preclearance requirement of Section 5." The Attorney Gen-
eral's letter also stated that in the event the City should elect to 
seek preclearance of the change from the Attorney General 
it should submit detailed information concerr}jng the change, 
4 The record reflects that. the citizens of Sheffield had been considering 
this change for some time. During the late 1960s. the City wrote the 
Attorney General of Alabama iind raised a number of questions concerning 
the procedures and mechanics for adopting a mayor-council form of 
government.. The Alabama Attorney Geneml's reply. which took the form 
of an opinion letter, iidvised what procedures would have to be followed 
to effect such a change and informed t.he City that if the elertorate voted 
to abandon the commission form of government Sheffield would return to 
the aldermanic form of government "as it existed ... at the time the 
commission form of government was adopted." 
5 The letter provided that the proposed change was governed by Art. 3 
of Title 37 of the Code of Alabama-now Code of Ala .. § 11-44-150 et seq. 
(1975)-that "rpJresent existing voting wards are not. changed at the time 
of voting (but mny be equitabl~· adjusted at a later date)" and thnt. "if the 
present commission type is abandoned. the [mayor aldermanic form tha.t 
·existed in 1912] would automatically be reinstated." 
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including a description of '(the aldermanic form of govern~ 
ment which existed in 1912 and the method by which it was 
elected, i. e., the number of aldermen, the terms and qualifi~ 
cations for the mayor and aldermen. whether the aldermen 
were elected at large or by wards, whether there were num~ 
bered post, residency, majority vote or staggered term require-
ments for the aldermanic seats, and whether single shot voting 
was prohibited." 
Thereafter the City informed the Attorney General that the 
proposed change would divide the City into four wards of 
substantially equal populatio11, that each ward would have 
two council seats. that councilmen from each ward would be 
elected at large, and· that candidates would- run for numbered 
places. Subsequently the City furnished a detailed map 
showing ward boundaries, data concerning the population dis-
tribution by race for each ward, and a history of black can-
didacy for city and county offices since 1965. The City's sub-
mission was completed on May 5, 1976. 
On July 6, 1976. the Attorney General notified the City 
that while he did not "interpose any objection to the change 
to a mayor council form of government, to the proposed dis-
trict lines or to the at-large election of the mayor and the 
president of the council," he did object to the implementation 
of the proposed at-large method of electing city councilmen· 
because he was "unable to conclude that the at-large election 
of councilmen required to reside in districts will not have a 
racially discriminatory effect." 
Notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection, the City 
scheduled an at-large council <'lection for August 10, 1976. 
On August 9. the United States instituted this suit in the 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to enforce 
its ~ 5 objection. A temporary restra.ining order w~ denied. 
After the election was held, a three-judge court was convened 
tt11d t_hat. court dismisse(J· t,he llllit. 430 F, Supp. 786 (NDI 
. 76-1662-0PINION 
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AI. 1977). The District Court una11imously held n that Shef:. 
'field was not covered by § 5 because it is not a "political sub-
division" as that term is defined in § 14 (c) (2) of the Act, 
·79 Stat. 445. 42 U. S. C. § l973Z (c)(2), which provides that 
"'political subdivision' means any county or parish except that 
where registration for voting is not conducted under the 
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any 
ather subdivision of a state which conducts registration for 
I 
·voting." See 430 F. Supp., at 788-789 and 790-792. The 
court also held. one judge dissenting, that "by approving the 
referendum, the Attorney General in fact approved the change 
to the Mayor-Council form of governme1;1t [in which aldermen 
were elec'ted at large]. notwithstanding [his statement] to the 
City that the change was also subject to preclearaJlCe." The 
court reasoned that the approval of the referendum constituted 
clearance of those aspects of the proposed change that the 
Atforney General knew would be implemented if the refer-: 
endum passed and that he must have known that Sheffield 
wpuld be opliged to follow Code of Ala .. 11- 43- 40 (1975), 
which requires the at-large election of aldermen in cities with 
populations of less than ~0,000. 430 F. Supp., at 789-790. 
We noted probable jurisdiction. - U. S.- (1977). We 
reverse. 
II 
We first consider whether Congress intended to exclude 
from § 5 coverage political umts. hke ]heffield. whiCh have· 
never conducted voter re istratfon. In concluding that Con-
gress 1 , the District Court npted that § 5 applies to "a 
6 The court initially decided the case on the ground that the Attorney 
General's .July 6, 1976 objection was one day out of time and hence 
ineffective. However, on petition for rehearing the court found that, 
because .Tuly 5, 1976 was a federal holiday, the .July 6 objection was timely, 
See 430 F. Sqpp., at 787. The court then considered the other grounalt,-
. (fiscussed infra. 
• 
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[designated] state or a [designatedl political subdivision" and 
construed § 5 to provide that, where a State in its entirety has 
been designated for coverage, the only political units within it 
that are subject to § 5 are those that are "political subdivi-
sions" within the meaning of§ 14(c)(2). Because the Dis-
trict Court interpreted § 14 (c) (2) as including only counties 
and the specific functional units of state government that 
register voters. it held ~hat poltical unlts like the City are not 
subject to the duties imposed by§ 5. 
There is abundant evidence that the District Court's inter- J 
~tion of the Act is cot}.tq}ry to the congressional intent. 
Q:U:at? and most significantly. the Distnct Court's construc-
tion is inconsistent with the Act's structure, makes § 5 cover-
f,lge depend upon a· factor completely irrelevant to the Act's 
purposes, and thereby permits precisely the kind of circumvcn-
~congressiqnal policy that § 5 was designed to prevent. 
ec<>IL.,the language of the Act neithe~es nor even 
supports such a cramped interpretation. ~ the District 
Court's reading is flatly inconsistent with the Attorney Gen-
eral's consistent interpretations of § 5 and with the legisla.tive 
history of its enactment and re-enactments. The language, 
st.-ucture. history, and purposes of the Act persuade us that 
§ 5, 'like the constitutional provisions it is designed to imple-
ment, applies to all entities having power over any aspect of 
the electoral process within designated jurisdictions. not only 
to counties or to whatever units of state government perform 
the function of registering voters. 
A 
Although this Court has described the workings of the 
Voting Rights Act in prior cases. sec, e. g., Allen v. State 
Board of Elections, 393 U. S .. )44 ( 1969); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). it is appropriate again to 
summarize its purposes and structure and the special function 
of § 5. Congress adopted the Act in 1965 to implement the 
fifteenth Amendment and erase the blight of racial cliscrimi· 
7 
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11ation in voting. See id., at 308. The core of the Act "is a 
C,2DJQMGX scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where 
voting disc'i!imfn a.tion has been the most flagrant." !d., at 
315. Congress 'resorted to these stern measures because 
experience had shown them to be necessary to eradicate the 
"insidious and pervasive evil of [racial discrimination in 
voting] that had been perpetrated in certain parts of the 
country." /d., at 309. Earlier efforts to end this discrimina-
tion by facilitating case-by-case litigation had proved ineffec-
tive in large part because voting suits' had been "unusually 
onerous to prepare" and "exceedingly slow" to produce results. 
And even when favorable decisions had been obtained, the 
affected jurisdictions often "merely switched to discriminatory 
devices not covered by the federal decrees." See id., at 
313-314. 
1 In pertinent parts,§ 4 (a) provides: 
"(a) To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is 
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be 
denied the right to vote in an~r Federal, State, or local election because o( 
his failure to comply with any test or device in ;my State with respect to 
which the drterminations have been made under the first two sentences o( 
subsection (b) of this section or in any political subdivision with respect to 
which such determination" havr been madr a~ a ~rparntr unit un)c&; the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for 
a declaratory judgment brought by Rurh State or subdivision against the 
United States has determined that no such trst or device has been used 
du~ing the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose 
or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account o( 
race or color r.J" 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (a) (1970' 
eel. Supp. V). 
8 In pertinent parts, § 4 (b) provides: 
"(b) The provisions of [§ 4 (a)] shall apply in any State or in any political 
subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General deter!J1ines main-
tained on Novembrr I, 1964, nny test or device, and with respect to which 
(2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per rentum 
of tht':' per:;ons of voting agr residing therein were registered on Novem-· 
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subject to the Act's special measures. Congress having found 
that there was a high probability of pervasive racial discrimi-
nation in voting in areas that employed literacy tests or similar 
voting qualifications and that. in addition, had low voter 
turnouts or registration figures. it provided that coverage in a 
State is "triggered" if it maintained any "test or device" 0 on a 
specified date and if it had voter registration or voter turnout 
of less than 50% of those of voting age during specified presi-
dential elections. When this formula is not met in an entire 
State, coverage is triggered in any "political subdivision" 
within the State that satisfies the formula.. Since § 4 (c) of 
the Act defines "test or device" as a "prerequisite for voting or 
registration for voting," 79 Stat. 438. 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (c). 
(emphasis supplied). it is clear that the Attorney General, in 
making a coverage determination, considers not only the voter 
registration process within a jurisdiction, but also the proce-
dures followed by the election officials at the polling places. 
A state or political subdivision which does not use literacy 
tests to determine who may register to vote but employs such 
tests a.t the polling places to determine who may cast a ballot 
may plainly be covered under § 4 (b). 
If designated under § 4 (b). a jurisdiction will become 
subject to the Act's special remedies unless it establishes. in 
a judicial action, that no "test or device" was used to dis-
criminate on the basis of race in voting. Section 4 (a) is 
one of the Act's core remedial provisions. Because Congress 
her 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the· 
pfe!:<idential election of November, 1964." 79 Stat . 438, as amended, 42' 
U.S. C.§ 1973 (b) (1070 ed . S11pp. V). 
n Section 4 (c) of the Act defines "te:<t or device" to "mean an~' require-
ment. that n person nH a prerequisite for voting or rcgistrntion for voting 
(1) demonstmte the ability to reacl. write, undeT~tand, or interpret any 
matter, (2) demonstrate rmy educational achievemrnt or his knowledge of 
· any particular subject, (3) pos~ess good moral character, or ( 4) prove hi~ 
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any otheJ'· 
·-elass." 79 Stat. 438,42 U. S. C.§ 1973b (c) . 
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determined that the continued employment of literacy tests 
and similar devices in covered areas would perpetuate racial 
discrimination. it suspended their use in ~ 4 (a). Just as the 
conduct of all election officials is relevant under ~ 4 (b). so 
§ 4 (a) imposes a duty 011 every entity in the covered jurisdic-
tions having power over the electoral process. whether or not 
the entity registers voters. That ~ 4 (a) has this geographic 
.reach is clear both from the fact that a "test and device" may 
be employed by any official with control over any aspect of 
an election and from ~ 4 (a)'s provision that its suspension 
operates "in any [designated] State ... or in any [desig-
natedl political subdivision." (Emphasis supplied.) The 
congressional objectives plainly required that ~ 4 (a) apply 
throughout each designated subdivision.' 0 If it did not have 
this scope. the covered States. which in the past had been so 
ingenious in the~the spirit of?ea"erar law. COUid 
have easilY circuriwent ea § 4 ral by, ;:-g: a lscontinuing the 
use of literacy tests to determine who may register but requir-
ing that all citizens pass literacy tests at the polling places 
before voting. 
Although ~ 4 (a.) is a potent weapon. Congress recognized 
that it alone would not ensure an end to racial discrimination 
in voting in covered areas. In the past. States and the politi-
. "1° The 1975 nmrndments to thP Art eliminate nny question but thnt. 
§ 4 (n)'s prohibition hn,: to npply to an~· state nctor within a d~ignated 
jurisdiction. Since these :unendments provide that, a>: to juri:-;dictions that 
are considrred for covrrnge brcauRe the~· had low voter turnout or registra-
tion in the November 1972 election, the phra;;e " trst or device" includes 
"any registm tion or voting notice;;;, forms, instruct ions. assistance, or other 
ma.terials or information relating to t.lw elrctoral process, including ballots, 
only in the English language, wherr thr Director of the Census determines 
that moiT than five prr centum of the citizens of \'oting ngP residing in sue~ 
State or political subdiviRion arr mrmber;; of a ;;inglc lnnguage minority," 
89 Stnt. 401. 42 U.S. C.§ 19n (f)(3). it i;; indi,;putablr that Congre~ 
contemplatPd that thr suspen~ion of tp;;t>' and drvices would apply to local 
officials other than t ho,;p who were employrd by the function a] unit of stntO 
'gQvernment that conducted voter rPgistrntion. 
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cal units within them had responded to federal decrees out-
lawing discriminatory practices by "resorting to the extraor-
dinary strategem of contriving new rules of various kinds for 
the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination." 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 lT. S .. at 335 (foot-
note omitted). To prev('nt any future circumvention of con-
stitutional policy, Congress adopted § 5 and shifted the 
advantages of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the 
evil to its victims by freezing a cove reef" .1 ur1sdietion's Cl~­
tion proced ures unless the changes could be shown to be 
nondiscriminatory. 
The foregoing discussion of the structure of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 belies the District Court's conclusion that 
§ 5 should apply only to counties and to the political units 
that conduct voter registration. As is apparent from the Act. 
§ 5 "was structured to assure the effectiveness of the dramatic 
step Congress [took] ill § 4" and "is clearly designed to march 
in lock-step with § 4." Allen v. State Boatd of Elections, 
supra, 393 U.S .. at 584 (Harlan, J .. concurring and dissenting). 
Since jurisdictions may be designated under § 4 (b) by reason 
of the actions of election officials who do not register voters 
and since§ 4 (a) imposes duties on all election officials. whether 
or not they are involved in voter registration. it follows from 
the very structur<' of the Act that § 5 has to apply to all 
entities exercising control over the electoral processes within 
the covered States of political subdivisions. In view of the 
structure of the Act. it would be unthinkable to adopt the 
District Court's construction unless there were persuasive 
evidence either that § 5 was intended to apply only to changes 
affecting the registration process or that Congress clearly 
manifested an intention to restrict § 5 coverage to counties or 
to the units of local govt>rnment that register voters. But the 
Act supports neither conclusion. 
The terms of the Act and decisions of this Court clearly 
indicate that § 5 was not intended to apply only to voting 
~hauges occurring within the registration process. Section 5 
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applies "to any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, 
or standard. practice, or procedure with respect to voting[.]" 
Since the statutory definition of "voting" includes "a.ll actions 
necessary to make a vote effective in any ... election. includ-
ing, but not limited to, registration, ... casting a ballot, and 
having such ballot ])roperly counted [.]." 79 Stat. 445. 42 
U. S. C. § 1973l (c) ( 1), § 5's coverage of laws affecting voting 
is comprehensive. 
The Cour 's decisions over the past 10 years have given 
§ 5 the broad scope suggested y t e anguage o t e ct. 
We 'first' construed it in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 
supra. There our examination of the Act's objectives and 
original legislative history led us to interpret § 5 to give it 
"the broadest possible scope." id., fit 567. and to require prior 
federal scrud ny or "any state enactment which altered the 
election law in a covered state in1~ven a minor way." \\ !d., a.t 
566. In so coqstrucing § 5. we una mmously re:iected 11-as the 
plain terms of the Act would themselves have seemingly 
required-the firgument of an appellee that § 5 should apply 
only to enactments affecting who may register to vote. Id., 
at 564. 
Our decisions have required federal preclearance of laws 
changing the location of polling place. see Perkins v. 
Mathews, 400 U ."'S. g7~ (Th1n-:-1aws adopting at-large systems 
of election, Perk·ins v. Mathews, supra; Fairley v. Pq.tterson 
(decided with Allen, supra); laws providing for ~he appoint-
ment of previously elected officials. Bunton v. Patterson 
(deciqed with Allen, supra); laws regulating candidacy. 
Whitley v. Williams (decided with Allen, supra.); laws changing 
voting procedures. Allen, supra; annexa.tions. City of Rich-
11 Although both \Ir . .Ju~ticl' Harlan nnd \Jr .. Justice Black dissented 
from aspect>' of the Court's holding- in A'l/en. neither disagreed with the 
prowsition that. the ~tntute had to be ron:;trued as covering changes 
occurring outside the rcgi~tration procrsR. &>c Allen v. State Board of 
'Elections, supra. :393 U. S., at 591-59:~ (Harlan, J., concurring and dissept-
'ing); id., a.t 595 (Bl!lck, .T., dissenting). 
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mond v. United States, 422 F. R. 358 ( 1975); C1:ty of Peters-
burgh v. U·nited States, 410 U. R. 962 ( 1973). aff'g per curiam, 
354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 1972); Perkins v. Mathe·ws, supra; 
and reapportionment and redistricting. Beer v. United States, 
425 U~.---f3o (I 9-,5) ; Geor gw v. 7Jii.ited Stales, 411 U. S. 526 
(1973); see United Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U. R. 
144 (1977). In these instances. federal scrutiny of the pro-
posed changes was required because each had the potential to 
deny or dilute the rights conferred by ~ 4 (a). 
In several of these cases, this Court decided that ~ 5's pre-
-clearance requirement applied to cities within designated States 
without ever inquiring whether the cities conducted voter reg-
istration. See Beer v. United Sta.tcs, supra; City of Richmond 
v. United States, supra; Perkins v. Mathews, supra. It is 
doubtful. moreover. that ~ 5 \vould have been held to be 
applicable in at least one of these cases if the District Court's 
interpretation of ~ 5 were the law.'~ 1\.lthough the assumption 
of these decisions-that cities are covered whether or not they 
conduct voter registration-perhaps has little stare decisis 
significance-the issue not having been raised "'-these deci-
sions underscore the obvious fact that. whether or not they 
register voters. cities can enact measures with the potential to 
dilute or defeat the voting rights of minority group members. 
Because ~ 5 embodies a judgment that voting changes 
occurring outside the registration process have the potential 
to discriminate in voting on the basis of race. it would be 
12 Cit11 of Richmond v. United States. W7H·a. of cour~r, involved a city in 
Virginia. There voter rrgi8trntion, whiiP conducted on n citywide bnsis, 
is-nnd was at. the timr of that ense-prrformrd. not b~· rmployees of the 
city, but by an electornl board appointrd by stntr judgef:. Srr Vn. Code 
Tit. 24.1, §§ 29, 43-46 (Cum. A. Supp. 1977). Under thr District Court's 
reading of § 5. it would sepm that T{irhmond':< Elrctoral Board, but not. 
the city itself, would be covPred. 
13 There is support for the propo~ition thnt previous derisions of this· 
Court in which issueo; were not qttrstionrd but were pn~sed sub silenti6· 
should not lightly be disregarded.. See Qrown Shoe Co. v. United States;. 
~ u. S,a94, 307 0962), •. 
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i·rrational for ~ 5 coverage to tum on whether· the political 
unit euacting or administering the change itself registers 
voters. But quite apart from the fact that this cramped con-
struction can not be squared with any reaonable set of objec-
tives, the District Court's interpretation of ~ 5 would permit I 
the precise evil that ~ 5 was designed to eliminate. Under it. 
local political entities like Sheffield wot~ld be fr-ee to respond to 
local pressure to limit the political power of minorities and 
take steps that would, temporarily at least, dilute or entirely 
defeat the voting rights of minorities. e. g., providing for the 
appointment of officials who previously had been elected. mov-
ing the polling places to areas of the city where minority 
gro4p members could not safely travel. or even providing that 
election officials could not count the ballots of minority voters. 
The only recours£' for the minority group members affected 
by such changes would be the one Congress implicitly found 
to be unsatisfactory: repeated litigation. Ree Uuited Jewish 
Organization v. Carey, supra, 430 U. S .. at 156. Not only 
would the District Court's reading place the advantages of 
time and inertia back on the perpetrators of the discrimina-
tion as to a.ll elections conducted by political units that do not 
re~ister voters. it would invite States to circumvent the Act in 
all other elections by allowing local entities that do not conduct 
voter registration to control critical aspects of the electoral 
process. The clear consequence of this interpretation would 
be to nullify both ~ 5 and the Act in a large number of its 
potential applications. 
B 
The terms of the Act do not require such an absurd result. 
In arriving a.t its interpretatlO'n-of 1 t.'trtf''"Distrw't""eourt 
focused on its language "a State or political subdivision with 
respect to which the prohibitions set forth in [ § 4 (a)] based 
upon determin!ltions made under [~ 4 (b)l are in effect." 
While § 5's failure to use the ph'rase "in a [ desigt1ated] State or 
subdivision" arguably provides a basis for an inference that 
'§ 5 was not intended to have the territorial reach of § 4 (a), 
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the actual terms of ~ 5, considered together with the Act's 
structure. suggest that Congress contemplated that ~ 5's cov-
erage would be coterminous with ~ 4 (a)'s. The coverage 
provision of ~ 5 specifically refers to both ~ 4 (a.) and § 4 (b). 
a fact which itself implies that § 4-not § 14 (c) (2)-is to 
determine the reach of § 5. And the content of § 5 supports 
this view. Section 5 provides that it is to apply to the juris-
dictions "with respect to which" § 4 (a)'s prohibitions are in 
effect. Since the States or political subdivisions "with respect 
to which" § 4 (a)'s duties apply are entire territories and not 
just county governments or the units of local government that 
register voters, § 5 must, it would seem, apply territorially as 
well. 
But we need not rely only upon the structural relationship 
between §§ 4 and 5 to demonstrate that the statutory terms 
do not compel the District Court's cr11mped interpretation of 7 
§ 5. The language and history of the rest of the Act rebuts 
any contenh on that 6mgress"~nded that§ 14 (c)(2) would 
limit tpe coverage of § 5 to specific functional units of local 
government. First. we note that the language of the Act 
tends to undermine any argument that Congress believed that 
§ 14 (c) (2)'s definition of "political subdivision" would have 
~ny significant connotations for the coverage of § 5. Because 
§ 5 reads in the disjunctive-applying to a designated "State 
or political subdivision ''-the concept of political subdivision 
has no statutory significance under § 5 where. as here , an 
entire State has been designated. In such cases the only 
question under the statute is whether a political unit, like 
the City, is included within the me~ning of the term "State." 
While we accept the District Court's assumption that the 
designation of the State of Alabama should have the same 
consequences for Sheffield as would the designation of the 
county in which it is located. the fact th{tt the concept of 
"political subdivision" has not direct relevance for § 5 cover-
age within a designated State suggests that Congress did not 
~nvision that the § 14 (c) (2) definition would be determina.-
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tive of the reach of § 5. If Congress had intended that § 14 
(c) (2) would impose a sweeping limitation on the scope of § 5, 
surely it would not have left this "gap" in the statute. 
Second. the § 14 '( c )(2) definition itself does not support 
the District Court. Even agreeing, arguendo, with the Dis-
trict Court that § 5 imposes a preclear11nce requirement qp 
only the "political subdivisions" of designated Stj:lteS, 11 the 
District Court's interpretation is sustainable only if we con-
strue § 14 (c) (2) as providing that "political subdivision" 
refers to specific functional units of state government and not 
to geographic territories. The Act's terms, content, and his-
tory compel a contrary conclusion on this score. 
In legislation like this-which, of course, is designed to 
enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth, and in some respects 
the Fourteenth. Amendment, sec '((atzenbach v. Morgan, 384 
U. S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. If.atzenbach, supra-011e 
would expect that references to "State or political subdivision" 
would not be limited to specific functional entities, but rather 
would apply to all entities or persons exercising gov~rnmental 
power in designated areas. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 
395 (1969); Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 ( 1953) (amend-
ments applv to all entities exercising governn)ental power 
within the States' borders). While we may agree that the 
11 Tlwrr i;.: 110 qur~tion buf fhnt fhr drsignntion of a Stnfr includr~ all 
the "polificnl ~ubdivi,;ion,.;" within it, a,.; i" indieatrd b~· the following cxeerpt 
from the lcgislntivr hisfor~· rrlird upon by thr Distriet Court: 
"Whrre an entiw Statr falls within . , . sub:seetion r4 (b)] ~o does rach 
and every political ;,;ubdivi~ion within that Statr." H. TI. Hep. No. 439, 
89th Cong .. l:,;t Sr:<,.;., p. 25 (19H5): 1-'ee S. Rrp. No. Hi2, Part:~, R9th Cong., 
1st. Srs~ .. p. 23 ( 1965). 
Of course, thr Disfricf Court',.; assumption fo thr contrnry notwith-
standing, this statement does not r~tablish I hat the on!~· enfitir:< in drsignatrd 
States which :u·r subject to §5 nrP tho~<r thnt arp rithrr counties or the 
units thnt regi:;ter voters. Tndrrd, :<incr this statrm(mf prrtnin:,; to thr 
scope of § 4. which elearl~· applir~ fo all political unit::: within rovrred_ 
juri:<dictions, it j~ difficult to ~('(' how it rau br J'('lird upon in ~-;upport or 
.ft. crnmped intrrprctation of § 5. 
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languagr of tlH' Act docs not eumpel such a11 interpretation. its 
terms. whrn considered in light of their sprcifie legislative 
histories. the Act's structure. and the broad congn•ssional 
objectives. support the intrrpretation that the phrase "political 
subdivision" refers not to a. specific functional unit of state 
govrrnmrnt. but rather to all state actors within covered 
jurisdictions. 
When considered in isolation. ~ 14 (c) ( 2) 's language pro-
vi drs no clear answer to tho question whether it is to refer to 
functional units or to gt>ographic territories.'" The statutory 
terms "county or parish ''-\\'hich entities seemingly fall within 
the statutory drfinition \\'lwtlwr or not they conduct voter 
registration '"-can refer either to functioning units of state 
govrrnmrnt or to geographic areas. Similarly. "any other 
subdivision of the State which conducts voter registration"-
entities which arc included in the definition only when counties 
do not supervise voter registration-can also denote areas of 
States. But while ~ 14 (c) ( 2) 's terms arc ambiguous when 
considered apart from the rt>st of tho Act. the statutory con-
texts in which the term "political subdivision" appears leave 
1'-ln concluding that § l-l (e) (2) rdc•nNI onl~· to ,;pecific functional units 
of ~ta te governmrnt, the District Court relied upon the following excerpt 
from the legislatiye hi,;tor.v : 
" I Th<' § 1-l (e) (2) definitionl mak<'~ el<•ar th:tf the• tPrm 'politi ca l ~ub­
divi,;ion' i:-; not intended to prwomp:1:-;~ precinct;;, Pl<'ction di"t ricts, or ot h<'r 
similar unit:-; whl'n th<'~· an• within a eount~· or p:1ri~h which ~upervises 
regi~tr:ltion for voting" S. Rep. No. 162, Part :~. 89th Con g., 1:-;1 Se:-;~ .. p. :n 
(191l5); ~ee H. H. Rep. No. -l:{9, .S9th Cong., J:-;t Seso;., p. :~~ (HlH5). 
While the statem<'nt. iR not. inrl<'vnnt, it certainly doe:-; not, clearly state 
that § 14 (c) (2) rcfer~ to function:tl entiti<'>', not. geographi<• areas, and it 
assmedl.v docs not rebut the other evidence of congre~:;:;ional intent that is 
referred to infrct . 
JG Since til(' ><taiut<' prond<·~ "'politica l >'uhdivi~ion ' ,;h:lll memz :my 
county or pari~h, except th:lt whcr<' regio<tration for voting i~ not conducted 
under the Rupen·ision of a !'Olmt.v or pari~h. the tcrm shall indude any 
othe1· subdivi~ion nf :l. Stale ll'hi<·h conduc·t~ regi~tration for voting" 
(emphasis ~-;upplied), it seem~ beyond question that countie.~ are always 
included. 
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little doubt that Congress understood that it delineated geo-
graphic locales. W c have already noted that § 4 of the Act 
contains the language "in I a] political subdivision''-a usage 
that would be nonsensical if the term denoted only specific 
functional units of local government-and that there. as else-
where in the Act. it is certain that Congress intended to 
include all entities exercising governmental power within those 
territories. See also 42 LT. R. C.§~ 1973a (a) (reference to suit 
to enforce guarantees of Fifteenth Amendment "in any State 
o•· political subdiYision); 1973a (b) (suspension of "tests and 
devices" "in any State or political subdivision" following insti-
tution of suit by Attomey General); 1973a (c). 
And both the contc11t and history of § 14 (c) (2) support 
this territorial reading of "political subdivision." \\re have 
noted that a "county or parish" is a political subdivision 
whether or not it conducts voter registration. Since county 
governments that do not register voters have no greater poten-
tial to affect voting rights than do. for example. cities. the 
automatic inclusion of counties would be difficult to squa•·e 
with any rational policy if ~ 14 (c)(2) were intended only to 
identify the govemmcntal entities that are. or may be. sub-
jected to the Act's special duties. Not only docs the anomaly 
disappear on tlw assumption § 14 ( c)(2) operates only to 
delineate the areas in which the Act's special duties may 
apply. but the legislaiive history explains the inclusion of 
counties. 17 
17 Thr DtrPdor of tlw C<·n~u~. who i~ om• of the fpderal oDi<'er:; charged 
with rna kin~ row• rage dPtrrmina t ion~; undrr § .t (b). tr,.tified beforr Congres~. 
that t.he Burrau ordinarii~· did not gathrr rrgist rat ion stat i~t ie:-; below the. 
county level. Thr rr>"pon:,;p~ and comments of thr Committrr member!'! 
suggest that count jp~ wrn• inrlud<'d in the drfinition of pol it ira ! subdivision 
to prrmit thr Crn~u" Burrau to d,,:;ignate nrr:t~ in nonrovrrrd State::< 
without. havin~ fir>'! to go 1hrou~h tlw burdrm;onw and rxpcnsi\e procedure-
of collecting datn ronrernin~ ~prrifi<', ~maliN loenlr~ . Srr Hrnrings of 
H. n. 6400 brforr SubrommittPL' Xo. 5 of thr Hou~e Committee on th<" 
.Juclici.nry, 89th Con~ .. J ~ t Rr,:.•., :{81-:t~.J. ( 19f\5) . 
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More signifieantly. the very aspects of the legislative history 
upon which appellees now rely suggest that ~ 14 (c) ( 2) was 
in fact originally in tt•JHl<'cl to refer to geographic area:s. Dur-
ing the House Committee Hearings on the administration ':s 
bill, then Attom(•y General Katzenbach. who played a central 
role in drafting the bill and in explaining its provisions to 
Congress. repeatedly. in response to questions from various 
committee members. described the term "political subdivision" 
·as referring to the areas in which voter registration is con-
'ducted. The colloquy further suggests that the Attorney 
' General's understanding was intended to be reflected in the 
congressional definition.· ~ Thus. the cone] usio11 is nigh ines-
IS "The Chairman. Thr bill :1l~o rrfrr~ lo ' polilirnl ::;ubdivisions.' How 
far down the political Rcnlr doe~ thnt go? 
"Mr. Knh1enbach. T believe th:t1 tllC' t('nn ' politiral subdivision' used in 
this billrenll~ · i~ aimed at ~!;Citing people regi~terecl. 
"Mr. Clwirman. For examplr, in New York. . . . I tnke thnt nn 
election clist rirt. would be deemed a. politiral subdi,·i~ion? 
"Mr. KalzPnbaPh . r think t.hat. i~ po~~iblr, 1\Ir. Chairman, but fmnkly, 
you are more familiar with how reJ!:istration is nrcomplif<hed in :\lew York 
thm1 Tam. I know how if. if< :1rromplit<hrd or uot. arrompli~hed in Alnbnma. 
"Mr. Chairman . What would be the lowl'~t possible political unit in 
the scale? 
"Mr. Kalzenbarh . What i.~ the m·ea in 1chich reaistmtion is done in 
New York ? T nm not familiar with lhnl Mr. Chairman." 
Hearing,; on H. 'R. 13.+00 befoTl' SubeommitteP No.5 of the Housr Committee 
on the .I udiriar~·, 89th Cong .. 1~1 sc~~ .• Jl. 21 ( 1905). (Emphasis Sllpplird.) 
"Mr. ::VfcCullough. If in the St:il •c of New York in 1964 there was a 
political subdi,·ision where lc~::; thnn 50 percent of the people voted or were 
registered to vote, wouldn't . that trigger thi~ bill in that political ~ubdivision 
in the State of New York? 
"l\lfr. K:1tzenbarh . I think it could Congrcs~mm1. 1 I hink the only way 
in which we rnn gnther vnlid "tati:-;lic~ hrre i~ rrnlly-wc arc niming at 
voter registration and T think the term ' political subdivisio-n' is used here 
aimed primarily at I he area in which the 1'egi&tmtion ]Jrcoess takes 7Jlace."· 
ld., nt p. 51. (Emph:1~1~ supplied.) 
"Mr. Roger,:. Scrtion + (n) provided that. when ilw Attorne~· General' 
·certifies that he has received the complaints in writing from 20 or more· 
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capable that ~ 14 (c) (2) was intended only to limit the areas 
that could be subjected to the Act's special remedies. not to 
limit the entities that would be subject to the Act's duties 
within the covered jurisdictions. 
Although the evidence that § 14 (c) (2) invariably has a 
geographic referent is compelling. we need not take the posi-
tion that "political subdivision" always denotes geographic 
areas to decide this case. For present purposes. it is enough 
that it is certain that the phrase has this mea.ning in some 
provisions of the Act. For. in view of the structure of the Act 
"itnd the congressional objectives, it is clear that if "politica.l 
subdivision" ever refers to all the politica.J units within desig-
nated areas. it must have this meaning to the extent that the 
concept of "political subdivision" determines the reach of § 5. 
So wlwther one focuses on the terms of § 5 alone or upon the 
meaning of § 14 (c)(2), the language of the Act refutes the 
District Court's conclusion that § 5 does not apply to the 
political units like the City. 
residents of a politieal ~11bdivision ... what do you interpret as a 
political :<ubclivi~ion in thnt, ca:<c? 
"Mr. Katzenbach. I brlieve thai political subdivision there means the 
same thing :ll'l it men.ns in Section 3, Congressman." Td., nt . 53. 
"Mr. Cramrr. In rvrry cit~· or j)olit ical subdivision in rver~· county? 
"Mr. K:1tzrnbach . Politil'al subdivision. a;; I attrmptecl to say, in my 
judgment, means that area. for ll'hi('h prople are registered and within which 
a registrar board operates. It i~ callPd diffrrrnt names in different. states. 
That is the rra~on for u~ing the tPrm 'political ~ubdivi~ion ' but it is meant 
to be coincidental ll'ith the area unde1· the SU7Jf'1'Vision of a board o/ 
1'egistration or election ." fd .. :tl iR. (Empha~i~ ~upplird.) 
u:Mr. Tenzer. Th:~nk .von. Mr. Chairman. I just hnve Ollf' question. 
Since you agree to define in thr Ia\\' i he trrm 'elect ion,' would ~·ou also to 
agree to definf' i he trnn 'political subdivi~ion,' so i here would be no 
question about that as one that regularly maintain~ n ~yHiem for registering· 
voters? 
"Mr. Katzenbach. I think it might br :1 good idra io definr political" 
subdivision . I i hink the committee ought. to con:;ider giving it considera~· 
fion ." Tel ., at 121. 
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Finally, the lcgislativf' history and other rf'latcd aids to asrpr·~ 
taining congrPssional intf'nt leavc littlr doubt but that Congress 
has alway ·-and certainly by 1075-understood that the Act 
1 applies territorially and includes political units like Sheffield 
whether or not they conduct voter registration. The specific 
narrow question was not extensively discussed at the tinw of 
briginal enactment. but there is nothing in the original legisla-
tive history that in any wa.y supports the narrow construction 
of the District Court. At least one statement made in the 
course of the debate over ~ 5 strongly suggests that Congress 
never intended to draw a distinction between cities that do 
and do not register voters. Tn support of an amendment that 
would have strick<'n ~ 5 from the Act. Senator Talmadge of 
Georgia--min u tt>s before tlw Rena tc voted to reject his amend-
ment--argued that the section was "far· fetched" h<'cauS<• it 
would require any city which sought to enact or administPr a 
voting change> to obtain federal preclcaranc(•. 111 Cong. Rec. 
10729. While this statement was made by an opponent of 
the Act. its proponents. one of whom was on the floor defend-
ing~ 5 at the time of Senator Talmadge's statement co11cerning 
its effect. se<' 111 Cong. Rcc. 10728 (remarks of Ren. Tydings). 
did not disagree with his assesment. which lends the stat<'ment 
significant pertinence. See Arizona v. California , 37:3 C S. 
546. 548 n. 85 (1963). 
What is perhaps a more compelling ar·gument concerni11g 
the original. and subsequent. congressional understanding of 
the scope of ~ 5 is that the Attonrey Ge11era.l has, since the Act 
was adopted in H)65. interpreted ~ 5 as requiring al'l political 
units in designated jurisdictions to preclear proposed voti11g 
changes.' n This con tern poraneous a elm i 11 istra ti V(' construction 
of the Act is persua~ive evidence of the original understanding, 
19 Thc r<•rord rrfl cet~ that lwill'<'rn .\up;u,.:t (i , 1965 and \Iay l. 1977. the 
At tornr~· Grnrral rrrri1·rd morr than SJOO propo~rd 1·ot ing; ehangr:< front 
lJOiitirHI unib other thnn rountir,- or puri"hr" thni <lo not rrgi"t<•r voter~. 
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especially in light of the extensive role the Attorney General 
played in drafting the statute and expla.ining its operation to 
Congress.~~~ See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 
U.S. 205.210 (1972); Udall v. Tallrna.n, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
In recognition of the Attorney General's key role in the 
formulation of the Act, this Court in the past has given great 
deference to his interpretations of it. See Perkins v. Mathews, 
.supra, 400 U. R .. at 390-391, 393-394." 1 Moreover. the Attor-
ney General's longstanding construction of the ~ 5 was reported 
to Congress by Justice Department officials in connection with 
the 1975 extension of the Act. See testimony of Assistant 
Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger at the Hearings on 
JI. R. 939. H. R. 2148. H. R. 3247. fl.nd H. R. 3501 before the 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary. 94th Cong .. 1st Sess .. p. 166 
(1975) ("1975 House Hearings"); testimony of Assistant 
Attorney General .J. Stanley Pottinger at the Hearings on 
S. 407, S. 903. R. 1297, R. 1409. and S. 1443 before Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, pp. 598-599 (1975) ("1975 Renate Hearings")."" 
And the legislative history of the 1970 and 1975 re-enact-
ments compellingly supports the conclusion that Congress 
20 Ser tc~timon~· of Attornr~· General KatzE:>nbaeh. In Hraring on H. R. 
,!)400 beforr Subcommitter No.5 of thr Hon~r Committrf' on the .JudiciarY., 
.89th Cong., l~t. Se:;::; .. p. f) et .~e<J. (196.5), nnd tr~timon~· of AttornP~· Genera.! 
Katzenbach on S. 15()-J- brforr thr Srnat<> Committrr on tlw Judiriary, 89th 
Cong., 1st SP~s., p. 14- et seq. (1965) . 
. :n The Attor·npy GE:>nrml'" r<•gulation~ :d~o IIHlientr hi" vi<'ll' that § 5, like 
§ 4 (a.), npplie:-: territori:dl~·: "Sf'rtion 5 .. . prohibit:; thp enforcement 
.in ccny jurisdiction covered by § 4 (a) I of ally voting change]." 28 CFR 
§ 51.1 (1976) . (EmplHtkii' :<npplird.) 
22 Thr Attonwy Gcrwml'~ stat.f'ment" and Pxhibit,.: appri,.:ed tho Congre~ 
that the Attornry GrnPral h:1d t rc:1 ted eitie;,; like Shrflleld, Ala., as covered 
by § 5. Sre al"o 1975 SPna1r Hearings, at 563-564 (diseu~sion of § 5 
submission from Montgomery, Ala .), and 5!iR (statement of .Justice Depart-
ment offirinl that t hPre wm; no need to cla.rify the Act to make certain 
·that city council l'cdistricting is covered) . 
.. 
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shared the A ttomey General 's view. In 1970. Congress ·was 
clearly fully aware of this Court's interpreta.tion of § 5 as 
reaching voter changes other than those affecting the registra-
tion process and plainly contemplated that the Act would 
continue to be so construed. See, e. g., Hearings before Sub-
committee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on 
H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538. and Similar Proposa.ls, 91st Cong .. 1st 
··sess., 1, 4. 18. 83, 130-l31 , 133, 147-149, 154- 155. 182-184, 
402-454 (1970); Hearings before Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on 
Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 91st Cong .. 1st 
and 2d Sess .. 48. 195- 196. 369- 370. 397- 398. 426- 427. 469 
(1970). The history ful'ther suggests that Congress assumed 
that, just as § 5 applies to changes that affect aspects of 
voting other than registration. so it also applies to entities 
other than those which coriduct voter registration. One of 
the principal factual arguments advanced in favor of the 
renewal of § 5 was that Anniston. Alabama-which, like Shef-
field, has never cond uctecl voter registra,.tion- had failed to 
obtain preclearance of some highly significant voting changes. 
See Joint Views of Ten Members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Relating to the Extension of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 116 Cong.'Rec. 55Ql ( 1970). 
The congressional history is even clearer with respect to ~ 
the 1975 extension. which. of course. is the legislation now in 
effect. Both the House and Senate Hearings on the bill reflect 
that the assumption that the coverage of ~ 5 was unlimited 
was widely shared and unchallenged. In addition to the 
aforementioned testimony of the then Assistant Attorney 
General. which of course has special significance. numerous 
witnesses expressed this view. either directly or indirectly. 
See. e. g., 1975 Senate Hearings, at 74-75 (in covered jurisdic-
tions ~ 5 requires preclearauce of all voting changes. and 
objections have been entered by the Attorney General at every 
stage of the electoral process). 112- 113 (describing preclear-
~nce of chang~s in. city of Montgomery, Ala.) , 463- 464-
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(stating that if Act were applied to Texas, § 5 would require 
preclearance of voting changes of cities and school districts, 
neither of which register voters~"), and 568 (statement by 
Justipe Department official that there is no need to clarify Act 
to make certain that city council redistricting is covered by 
§ 5); 1975 House Hea1·iugs. at 332 (referring to city of 
Bessemer. Ala., as "covered jurisdiction'') and 631-632 
(describing lengthy § 5 preclearance process for Charleston, 
S. C.-a city which. like Sheffield. does not conduct 
voter registration) .21 More signific;wtly. both the House and 
Senate Committee Reports preclude the conclusion that § 5 
was not understood to operate territorially. Not only do the 
reports state that § 5 applies "[i]n [designated] jurisdic-
tions." see S. Rep. No. 94-295. 94th Cong .. 1st Sess., p. 12 
(1975) ("1975 Senate Report''); H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess .. p. 5 (1975) ("1975 House Report") (emphasis 
supplied), they also announce that one benefit of the pro-
posed extension of the Act to portions of Texas \vould be that 
Texas cities a11d school districts-neither of which has ever 
registered voters-would be subject to the preclearance re-
quirement. 1975 Senate Report. at 27-28; 1975 House Report, 
at 19-20. Finally. none of the opponents of the 1975 legisla-
tion took issue with the common assumption that § 5 applied 
to all voting changes within covered States. lndeecl. they 
apparently shared this view. Sec 121 Cong. Rec. S13072 
(daily eel. July 21. 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stennis) ("[a]ny 
[voting changes] ... made in precincts, county districts, 
school districts. municipalities, or state legislatures, or any 
other kind of offices, halve] to be submitted to the Attorney 
General"). See also 121 Cong. Rec. S13331 (daily eq. July 22, 
1975) (remarks of Sen. Allen). 
In short, the legislative background of the enactments and 
2 a See Tex. Elec. Codo Ann., Art. 5.09 (1967); Art. 5.13a (1976) 
(Vernon) . 
~1 See S. C. Code §§ 7-5-lO, 7-5-30, 7-5-610 to 7-5-630 (1976). 
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re-enactments compel the conclusion that Congress always 
understood that. as the purposes of the Act and its terms 
suggest. ~ 5 of the Act covers all political units within desig-
nated jurisdictions like Alabama. Accordingly. we hold that 
the District Court erred in concluding that ~ 5 does not apply 
to the city of Sheffield. 
III 
Having decided that Sheffield is subject to ~ 5, we must 
consider whether the District Court properly concluded that 
the Attomey General's failure to object to the holding of the 
r·eferendum constitutC'd clearance under ~ ·5 of the method of 
electing rity councilmen under the nC'w government. Only a 
few words arc needed to demonstrate that the District Court 
also erred on this point. 
It bears emphasizing at the outset that the purpose of ~ 5 
is to establish procedures in which voting changes can be 
scrutini~ed by a federal instrumentality before they become 
effective. The basic mechanism for preclearance is a declara-
tory judgment proceeding in the District Court for the District 
of Columbia. but the Act. of course. establishes an altcmative 
procedure of submission to the Attorney General to give 
"covered States a rapid method of rendering new lavvs effec-
tive." Allen v. State Boar·d of Education, supra, 393 U. S .. 
at 549. Under the statute's terms. the Attorney General will 
be treatrd as having approV(•d a voting change if such change 
has "been submitted ... to I him] and [hel has not inter-
posed an objection with sixty days after such submissio·n" or· 
if the change has been submitted .&nd "the Attorney General 
has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be 
made." 42 U. S. C. ~ 1973c. (Emphasis supplied.) See also 
Georgia v. United States, supra, 411 F. S .. at 540. Whil<: the 
Act does provide that inaction by tlw Attorney General may, 
under certain circumstances. constitute federal preclearance of 
a changC', the purposes of the Act would plainly be subverted 
if the Attorney General could ever be deemed to have approved 
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a voting change when the proposal was neither properly 
submitted nor in fact evaluated by him. But the District 
Court held precisely that. 
First. it is clear on this record-and the District Court did 
not find otherwise-that the city of Sheffield did not. in its 
March 20. 1975 letter. submit to the Attorney General a 
request for preclearance of the change in the City's form of 
government. Sheffield's letter sought approval only for the 
holding of the referendum."'· Moreover. under the Attomey 
General's own regulation. the validity of which is not ques~ 
tioned. the City could not at that tillle have sought preclear-
ance of the change in the form of government because. as the 
March 20. 1975 letter stated. see n. 4. supra, the details of the 
change had not yet bef'n worked out. Sec 28 CFR ~ 51.7 
(1976). 20 
And there is no question but that the Attorney General did 
not intend to approve the proposed change to a mayor-council 
government and could not be understood as having done so. 
When the A ttomey General wrote the City and told it that he 
had decided not to interpose an objection to the holding of the 
referendum. he warned that the change itself required 
prior federal scrutiny. and he apprised it of the information 
it should supply if it wished to attempt to preclear the change 
2 " Tn thi~ ronnrction it hear~ noting that thr Attonw~· Orneral's 
regulution;,; providt' that ~uch IPtter~ ;,;hould l'IP:tl'l~ · ~et forth th<' proposed 
change nfTrcting voting for· whi<·h rl<';t r·nrwr i:; being sought. Sec 28 CFR 
§§ 51.5. 51.10 (a) (J97o) . 
2 <: In pertinrnt part~. thi~ pro, · id<'~ " I R jrganling a chnngp a:,; to which 
approval b~ · rrfrrrndum ... i~ rrquirwl . . . , the Attornr.' · GPnernl may 
comdder and r::<~ue :t del'i~ion corH·Pming the change prior to thr rrfer-
endum .. . if all othrr aetion nP<'<'"':<:tr~· for adoption h:t~ been taken.'t 
Since it quitr frequrntl~· \\'ill lw 11w ca:;p that it \\'ill not be po~~ible to 
determine \\'hrthrr a voting rhnng<' ha~;. thr purpo:<r or effrct of rac·inl 
discrimination until the prrri~P pantmetN,.: of th<' chang<' arr known, there 
is no question but that. thi~ rrgulation i~ a n'a~omtble mran~ of adminis~ 
tering the Act and, :t.~ "uch, i:-- valid. Set' Georgia v. United States, supl'a, 
411 U. S., a~ 538. 
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in government \\"ith tlw Attorney Uenc>ral. rather than 111 
federal district cow·t. 
Under the circumstances. it is irreleva11t that the Attonwy 
General might have been on notice that. if tlw rderendun1 
passed. Shrfficld would have been requit·ed by state law to 
au opt an at-largr Rystrm of councilmanic eJectioiJR. :~• A ]though 
the City could have easily placed the request for prf'clearance 
of the change in the form of govemmpn t bcforr the A ttomey 
General-i.e., by taking all action necessary for tlw con1pletion 
of the change before submitting it. se<> 28 CFR ~ 5l.i (19i6). 
and by stating in its letter that it desired preclearallC(' of the 
change itself. sec id., ~~ 51.5. 51.10 (a )-it did not. so the 
Attorney General. quite properly. treated s hc\ffief(f*as having 
sought prior clearance only of the referendum. Accordingly, 
the District Court erred in concluding that the .\ttorney Gen-
eral has to be understood as having approved tlw adoption of 
an at-largr system of c}('ction. 
Since we concludr that Sheffield is covrred by ~ 5 of the 
Act and that the Attomey General did not clear tlw City's 
decision to adopt a system of government in which councilmrn 
are elected at large, the judgment of the District Court is 
Reversed. 
27 We ob~erYe that :If till' timP or thr Attorne~· Cenrral '~ npprontl of the 
referendum, it, wa ~ l'ar l'rom rlcar that. Alnbarll:t law I'Nfuirrd that a 
· mayor-council gowrnmPtlt in 8hrflic•ld mrludr an at-largp ~~ ·~tern of Plecting 
councilmen . Both tlw Alnbama r\ttonw~· (iPner•tl '>< I!J(i~ opinion , sec n. 3, 
supra, and the Cit _, ·'~ \l:trclt :.?0, Hli5 lettl'r, HC'(' 11 . .J . supm. ~t:lled that 
Sheffield would rc•fnl'll to th(' I\Jl:2 ~~·Htem , in which rouncilmen were 
elected by rach of the four ward~, if the rderrndum w<'rr to fl""'"· Indeed, 
the recordrrflc<'f~ that the City bad HOlllP difli<'ult~· prr,;uading the Attorney 
General thnt state law <•vrn permittrd it. fo :tdopt an at large "ystem. 
Thus, it, srrms that the Dt"tnet Court',; <'On('ht,;wn that the Atfomey 
General muHt havr known that at-large rleetionH wrn• rrquirrd by Jaw is 
ltself questionable, 
lfp/ss 9/14/7 
September 14, 1977 
No. 76-1662 U.S. v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala. 
This is a brief memorandum to record my initial 
impression after having read the two opinions of the three 
judge district court and the SG's brief. As of this date, 
appellee's brief has not been delivered to my Chambers. 
This is the Voting Rights Act case in which a three 
judge court held that Sheffield, Alabama, a city of some 
13,000 populaton, is exempt from §5 of the Act because it does 
not conduct its own voter registration. In Alabama voter 
registration is conducted by the counties and not by cities 
such as Sheffield. 
Alabama is a state designated under §4(b) as subject 
to the Act, including §5 thereof. That section requires a 
covered "state or political subdivision" desiring to change 
any voting procedure to obtain preclearance from the Attorney 
General or from the DC in the District of Columbia. The 
phrase "a state or political subdivision" appears in several 
places in the Act, and the term "political subdivision" is 
defined in §14 (c) (2) as follows: 
--
2. 
(2) The term "political subdivision" shall mean 
any county or parish, except that where registration 
for voting is not conducted under the supervision of 
a country or parish, the term shall include any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts registration 
for voting. 
The question presented is whether, in the 
circumstances of this case, the foregoing definition of 
political subdivision is applicable. If so, the SG concedes -
in effect - that the decision of the three-judge court is 
correct. The SG agrees "that Sheffield is not a 'political 
subdivision' within the meaning of §14". (Br • p. 13) • 
The SG contends, however, that the term "political 
j' I '-Y 
subdivision" as defined i~~is relevant only in situations 
when an entire state is not designated under §4(b) as covered 
....... ._a ~ 
by the Act. In other words, if only certain counties or 
cities in Alabama had been designated they would have been 
limited to political subdivisions which conducted their own 
registration of voters. 
I will not undertake here to summarize the arguments 
pro and con. If the language of the Act that appears to be 
relevant is read literally (i.e. given its "plain meaning"), 
the holding of the three-judge court probably is correct. The 
SG's answer is that we must look at the "structure" of the 
entire Act, its original legislative history, its purpose, the 
AG's consistent interpretation of it, and the presumed 
congressional approval of that interpretation when the Act 
3. 
was extended in 1970 and again in 1975. 
The SG's arguments, certainly at the policy level, 
are powerful indeed. It would not make a great deal of sense 
to allow the cities in a state with registration laws like 
those of Alabama to escape compliance with the Act whereas 
cities located in other states that provide for registration 
of voters within cities would be covered. Certainly, it is 
difficult to believe that Congress intended to allow some 
cities to escape the broad net it sought to cast by the Act. 
But the analysis by the three-judge court, based 
almost exclusively on the language of the Act, is not without 
considerable force. I think we can be sure that the Court 
will wish to sustain the overall intentions of Congress 
~provided we can eYsta~n this from the 9?e~ali structure of the 
Act without doing manifest violence to its explicit language. 
Subject to more careful examination, and to conferring with my 
~~ 
clerk, I am ~to believe this can be done. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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the interpretation urged by the SG, I think his 
position is right. There are no cases on this question, 
except those that are pending now. Of course, in many cases, 
cities and other political units that do not conduct 
registration have sought pre-clearance under § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act; until now, their obligation to do so has been 
assumed. To some extent, Perkins v. Matthews, 400 u.s. 379, 
and Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, shed light 
on the question, but only obliquely. I have not had time to 
examine the legislative history myself; but Justice Blackmun's 
clerk (Mike Sundermeyer) tells me that the excerpts quoted in 
the briefs are representative. 
I shall consider both sides' arguments in the order 
in which they are presented by the SG. The bulk of the memo 
will be devoted to the question whether cities and other 
non-registering political units, within covered states or 
political subdivisions, are subject to the pre-clearance 
. . 
2. 
requirements of the Act. The remainder will consider whether 
the Attorney General in fact approved the voting change at 
issue in this case, contrary to his contention that he did not. 
II. Interpretation of the Statute 
The basic problem in this case concerns ajivergence 
(recently discovered, it seems) between the purposes of the 
Voting Rights Act and the language of certain of its 
provisions. The critical statutory language appears in 
§§ 4 (b), 5, and 14 (c) (2) of the Act. Section 14 (c) (2) defines 
"political subdivision", for purposes of the Act, as 
"any county or parish, except that where 
registration for voting is not conducted 
under the supervision of a county or 
parish, the term shall include any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts 
registration for voting." 
Section 4(b) uses the definition of "political subdivision" in 
§ 14 (c) (2) to define the jurisdictions covered by the Act. It 
sets out the statutory coverage formula as follows: 
"The prov1s1ons of subsection (a) of this 
section shall apply in any State or any 
political subdivision of a state which (]) 
the Attorney General determines maintained 
on November 1, 1964, any test or device, 
and with respect to which (2) the Director 
of the Census determines that less than 50 
per centum of the persons of voting age 
residing therein were registered on 
November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per 
. centum of such persons voted in the 
presidential election of November, 1964." 
.. 
Section 4(b) goes on to make provision for similar 
determinations to be made by the Attorney General and the 
Director of the Census periodically after 1964, in order to 
bring other States or political subdivisions within the Act's 
coverage if necessary. Section 5 sets out the requirements 
for pre-clearance of changes in voting procedures in covered 
areas. The pre-clearance procedures apply 
"[w]henever a State or political 
subdivision with respect to which the 
prohibitions set forth in [§ 4(a)] .•• 
are in effect shall enact or seek to 
administer any voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to 
voting different from that in force or 
effect on November 1, 1964, [or the dates 
specified in the other sentences of § 
4(b)] ••. 
Section 5 goes on to specify the procedures by which "such 
State or subdivision" may effect its p...,.roposed change in -
voting practices. (The full text of these provisions appears 
in the Jurisdictional Statement at 23a-29a.) 
The position of the Board of Commissioners of 
Sheffield, Alabama [hereinafter "Sheffield"] is simply that 
Sheffield is not a political subdivision as defined in § 
14(c) (2), because it does not conduct voter registration, and 
therefore its electoral changes are not subject to 
pre-clearance within the literal terms of § 5. The SG 
concedes that Sheffield is not a political subdivision within --
the meaning of the Act. Although the SG does not take the 
position, I believe the 
3. 
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present situation is attributable, in part, to the Court's 
expanded perception, adopted in Allen and Perkins, of the 
.___. _....-.,__........._ ---
scope of electoral changes with which Congress was concerned 
when it passed the Act. I say "in part" because even if the 
Act were construed as set out in Mr. Justice Harlan's partial 
dissent in Allen, the anomaly of the present situation would 
exist. See Part II. D. infra. I conclude that the -
incongruity between the language of the statute and Congress' . ~ 
probable intent not to let non-registering political units 
escape the coverage of the Act (and thereby effect voting 
changes that states and political subdivisions could not 
effect, even in the non-registering units) is attributable to 
congressional oversight. I think Congress simply assumed that -----
the kind of voting changes with which it was concerned, even 
at the lowest levels of government, would be effected by 
counties or whichever unit registered voters. 
II. Statutory Interpretation 
A. The language of the Act 
Both sides have arguments based on the language of 
the Act. Sheffield's primary argument is the literal one JV~ 
mentioned above: because it does not register voters, the~~~~ 
city is not a "political subdivision" under§ 14(c) (2) and 
therefore is not subject to the pre-clearance requirements of 
§ 5. This argument would end discussion if it were not so .......__ I 
contrary to the overall purpose of the Act and the 
assumptions, until now, of Congress, the Attorney General 
•· 
... 
and the political units themselves. Sheffield's primary 
argument based on the statutory language is buttressed by two 
others. 
First, § 5 allows a political subdivision to proceed 
with implementation of its proposed electoral change by 
obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District Court for 
the District of Columbia or by submitting the change to the 
Attorney General. Sheffield argues that since political 
subdivisions alone are authorized to obtain pre-clearance, 
there is no statutory mechanism for an entity that is not a 
political subdivision to comply with § 5. As stated by 
Sheffield, it lacks "standing" to undertake the § 5 procedures 
The simple answer to this point is that if the SG's 
theory prevails, the literal interpretation of "political 
subdivision" for purposes of compliance will fade along with 
the literal interpretation for purposes of coverage. I doubt 
that the Court would hold that§ 4(b) applies to Sheffield's 
proposed voting changes but that Sheffield cannot seek to 
comply under § 5. The argument is a make-weight argument. It 
supports Sheffield's view that under the literal terms of the 
statute, only voting changes effected by states or political 
subdivisions require pre-clearance, but it is not an argument 
with independent force. It simply points out that Congress 
used terminology consistently throughout the Act. 
Even if Sheffield's literal interpretation of the 
"standing" requirement in § 5 were adopted, it would not be 
fatal to the SG's argument. It would not be unthinkable to 
6. 
say that the state or political subdivision of which the city 
is a part would have to present the changes to the D. C. 
district court or the Attorney General. As a practical matter 
this option is less desirable, in my opinion, than refusing to 
construe the statute literally, but it tends to defeat 
Sheffield's "standing" argument. 
The second subordinate point, made not by Sheffield 
~- ......... -
but by amicus Westheimer Ind. School Dist., is that Congress 
knew how to include political units other than states or 
political subdivisions when it wanted to. The amicus 
contrasts the language of§ 14(c) (2) with that of 42 U.S.C. § 
~ 1971, which provides: 
"All citizens of the United States who are 
otherwise qualified by law to vote at any 
election by the people in any State, 
Territory, District, County, City, Parish, 
Township, School District, municipality, 
or other territorial subdivision, shall be 
entitled and allowed to vote at all such 
elections, without distinction of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude; 
" 
Although this argument is not without force, I do not buy it. 
Section 1971 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 
1970; it is not part of the same legislation as the provisions 
here at issue. Also, the concern of the Voting Rights Act was 
primarily with discrimination in registration and related 
activities, so there is a logical explanation for Congress' 
choice of the unit that conducts registration as the relevant 
statutory unit. See Part II. D. infra. After Allen and 
7. 
Perkins, however, registration is not the exclusive focus of 
the Act; and, as discussed in the next paragraphs and 
Part II. D., Congress may have chosen the registering unit 
because registration figures were relevant for purposes of the 
coverage formula. I do not regard the difference in language 
as dispositive. 
The SG focuses on other language in the statute. The 
Act's protections "apply in any State or in any political 
subdivision of a State" covered by § 4 (b) (emphasis added by 
the SG) . The SG interprets this to mean that the 
{ pre-clearance requirements of § 5 apply to any voting changes 
within the contemplated scope of the statute that take place 
\ 
\
at any governmental level within a covered territory. I agree 
with this interpretation. It flows from recognition of the 
fact that when a whole state is covered, voting changes 
...___...___ 
enacted by political subdivisions must be pre-cleared, even ---- ~......_ 
though the subdivision itself is not separately designated. --...... _, 
The court below subscribed to this view, see J.S. 13a, and the 
view is confirmed by the legislative history. See the SG's 
brief at 14-15. If changes by a political subdivision must be 
pre-cleared, even though the subdivision could be designated 
separately but was not, then it makes more sense that 
political units that cannot be designated separately are 
covered when the whole state is covered. This point is 
corroborated by considerations subsumed under the SG's points 
about the need for uniformity of coverage among states and 
8. 
statutory purpose: The point is that if a whole state is 
covered, it should not make any difference whether electoral 
changes at the local level are enacted by the state itself or 
local units to whom such power has been delegated by the state. 
B. The Need for Uniformity of Coverage 
The law varies from state to state as to which 
political body is empowered to effect changes in voting 
practices at the local level (or, at the level of any unit 
that does not conduct its own registration). In Alabama ~ 
counties conduct registration but the state has given ~~~~ 
municipalities the authority to change election practices. Wt.Al"-
Code of Alabama, Title 37, § 34 (Supp. 1973). In Georgia, on ~~ 
the other hand (the state involved in the Allen litigation) , 
changes in local election laws can be made only by the state 
legislature. Code of Ga. Ann. § 69-1018(a) (1). See the SG's 
brief at 16 & nn. 9 & 10. If a municipality is immune from 
§§ 4 & 5 because it is not a political subdivision, a state 
could escape the strictures of the Act by delegating election 
authority to localities, thereby accomplishing without 




The SG argues that its position is supported 
by reference to Perkins, where the Act was applied to the city 
of Canton, Mississippi, which the SG says is no more a 
political subdivision than the city of Sheffield. See the 
SG's brief at 17 n. 11. I believe the SG to be mistaken on 
this point. The SG concedes that Canton, Miss1ss~
conductea its own voter registration. The SG attempts to 
minimize the significance of this fact by pointing out that 
counties in Mississippi also conduct voter registration, 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
.... 
9. 
C. Statutory Purpose 
S /' ;., The SG's main (and obvious) argument from the purpose ~~ 
of the statute is that the Court should not adhere to a 
.t-,..;l f.A.~ 
literal construction of the statute's language but should keep 
in mind the legislation's overall purpose. The SG cites the 
Court's departure from literalism in its jurisdictional 
holding in Allen, 393 U.S. at 557-60. See SG's brief at 18-19. 
But in this section of its brief the SG also suggests 
,-.... 
what I view as the 1kost attractive way of deciding this case. 
The route has been suggested implicitly and alluded to above. 
The SG points out that since the source of authority for the 
Voting Rights Act is the Fifteenth Amendment, which speaks in 
terms of prohibition of state action to deny or abridge the 
right to vote, the focus, as in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, should be on whether particular action by a 
unit of local government can and should be attributed to the 
-..._......_ 
state. I say that the SG has been 
(Footnote 1/ continued from prev. page) 
so that, since § 14(c) (2) states that political units other 
than counties or parishes are considered political 
subdivisions only "where registration for voting is not 
conducted under the supervision of county or parish"(emphasis 
added), even a city in Mississippi that conducts registration 
does not qualify as a political subdivision. This is 
far-fetched reasoning indeed. Congress probably was thinking 
of the usual situation in which there would not be overlapping 
authority to conduct registration. In a case of overlaping 
registration authority, the more sensible interpretation of 
§ 14 (c) (2) is that the city is a political subdivision, 
because for purposes of the elections for which the city 
conducts its own registration, the county in effect does not 
conduct registration • 
10. 
building up to this, whether intentionally or not, because the 
unstated assumption behind what has been said so far (in the 
SG's brief and in this memo) is that local government units, 
as creatures of the state, should not be allowed to do what 
the state itself is prohibited from doing. Sheffield does not 
address this view, because it is only implicit in most of the 
SG's brief and explicit in only two paragraphs. SG's brief at 
19-20. But several of Sheffield's and amicus' points 
~ 
unintentionally meet the SG's point~ on each of the~ ' the SG 
has the better of the argument. 
At pages 5-6 of its brief, Sheffield cites § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act in support of its position that the Act is 
directed at states and counties, not at lower levels of local 
government. Section 2 provides: 
"No voting qualification or prerequisite 
to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by 
any State or political subdivision to deny 
or abridge the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of race 
or color." 
While Sheffield has no trouble gleaning from this section the 
proposition that the Act cannot apply to lower levels of 
government, Sheffield never explains why it would be 
consistent with the Act to allow a creature of the state to 
accomplish what would be illegal if done by the state. Of 
course, Sheffield need not go so far~ nothing in the Act 
prevents private citizens or the Attorney General from suing 
to enjoin the enforcement of discriminatory voting laws. But 
the prophylactic measure of § 5 was thought necessary by 
Congress because single lawsuits were perceived to be 
inadequate to the task. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301. As noted above, states could evade § 5 by 
delegating all responsibility for elections (except 
registration) to local government, and the purpose lauded by 
Sheffield in § 2 would be defeated. 
Amicus Westheimer Ind. School District focuses on the 
parallellism of statutory language in § 5. Amicus argues that 
the main purpose of the Act was registration, and that the 
only reason counties were included in the statute (in addition 
to the inclusion of legislation by the state itself) was that 
Congress was concerned as much with discriminatory 
administration and enforcement as with discriminatory 
legislation. Amicus justifiably identifies the state itself 
with legislation and the county, or other unit conducting 
registration, with administration. Congress' "solution was 
the unique definition of 'political subdivision', aimed at 
attacking vices in the registration process itself." Amicus 
"call[s] the Court's attention to the 
structure of the first sentence of the 
section, which repeats three times the 
dichotomy 'State or political subdivision 
.•• enact or seek to administer.' 
'State' is clearly intended to be coupled 
with 'enact', so that state-wide 
legislation will be covered. 'Political 
subdivision' thus is linked to 'seek to 
administer' so that local enforcement of 
registration laws will be covered." 
Westheimer brief at 21 n. 7. As far as it goes, this 
observation is accurate. But it fails to take account of 
several factual scenarios that would not conform to this 
traditional model. What of the situation in which the state 
not only delegates to the county authority to administer 
elections and enforce state-created rules, but also gives the 
county responsibility for administration and legislation? The 
county's supervisionof registration would be irrelevant to its 
authority to make or change the rules. The power of the 
Attorney General to designate a political subdivision is 
irrelevant when the state is covered and delegates its 
authority to the subdivision. Similarly, when the state 
delegates its legislative authority to a political unit that 
does not conduct registration, the power to "enact" has passed 
to that body. The power to "administer" probably accompanies 
it as well. Should not the body with legislative power be 
subject to the pre-clearance requirements of the Act? 
A possible objection to this theory, easily 
answerable, is that including every political unit within a 
covered states makes meaningless the alternative provision for 
designating a county or other political subdivision. I think 
this point is made in the Westheimer brief at 17, but it is 
hard to tell. The short answer is that the provision allowing 
separate designation of counties, without designating an 
entire state, allows greater refinement in application of the 
Act. If a particular county in a state has used a test or 
device and had less than 50% voter registration or 
participation, then it can be subjected to the Act without 
affecting the rest of the State. Thus, the possibility of 
designating a unit smaller than the whole state is an 




D. Legislative History 
1. Prior to passage of the Act 
The legislative history cuts both ways. On the 
one hand, the legislative history indicates Congress' primary 
concern with voter registration and other aspects of access to 
the ballot box. This comes out in the legislative history 
cited by both sides. Resp and amicus Westheimer emphasize 
Congress' exclusive concern with those units of government 
that had authority over the registration process, either 
through legislative or administrative power. A strong piece 
of legislative history in resp's favor is the statement that 
the definition in§ 14(c) (2) 
"makes clear that the term 'political 
subdivision' is not intended to encompass 
precincts, election districts, or other 
similar units when they are within a county 
or parish which supervises registration for 
voting." 
Resp's brief at 11 (quoting 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
2569). 
The SG agrees that Congress was concerned about 
registration, but adds that Congress was also concerned with 
other means of discriminting against minorities in voting. 
The SG says that Congress focused on political units that 
conduct registration because of the coverage formula. In 
other words, Congress' concern in deciding how to determine 
which areas would be covered may not have been exactly 
congruent with its notions of which political units within 
14. -
covered areas would seek to effect covered electoral changes. 
(This relates to the SG's emphasis on the words "in any State" 
or "in any political subdivision".) The SG asserts that 
Congress chose to tie coverage to units that conduct 
registration because as to those units the Director of the 
Census could obtain valid registration statistics, in order to 
determine whether registration or voter participation was 
below 50%. This is confirmed in an except from Attorney 
General Katzenbach's testimony, quoted by Sheffield, in which 
he said: "I think the only way in which we can gather valid 
statistics here is really -- we are aiming at voter 
registration and I think the term 'political subdivision' is 
used here aimed primarily at the area in which the 
registration process takes place." Sheffield brief at 13. 
If the Act were construed to extend only to changes 
affecting the registration process, Sheffield's position would 
have greater merit. But in Allen and Perkins, a majority of 
the Court perceived Congress' intent to have been to include 
other kinds of electoral practices. In Perkins, Mr. Justice 
Breannan confirmed the accuracy of Mr. Justice Harlan's 
observation, in his partial dissent in Allen, "that the 
Court's holding [in Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (a 
companion case to Allen)] rested on its conclusion that 
'Congress intended to adopt the concept of boting articulated 
in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and protect Negroes 
against a dilution of their voting power.'" Perkins, supra, 
400 u.s. 390 (quoting Fairley v. Patterson, supra, 393 U.S. at 
580) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Justice Harlan's opinion in 
• 
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Allen and its companion cases is, as usual, n'ighly 
persuasive. He observed that the Court's citation of Reynolds 
v. Simms, a decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment, is 
incorrect in the context of the Voting Rights Act, which is 
based squarely on the Fifteenth Amendment. 393 u.s. at 588. 
Justice Harlan viewed the purpose of the Voting Rights Act to 
be limited to ensuring access to the ballot box and the ballot 
not increasing minority political power. 
It would be tempting to say that if the Court had 
accepted Justice Harlan's conception of congressional intent, 
the instant case would be easier. If the Act was intended to 
cover only abuses in creating or administering registration 
requirements, it would be fairly obvious that only political 
units that have authority over aspects of registration are 
covered by the Act. There would be perfect congruence between 
statutory language and statutory purpose. But the issue is 
not that simple. Justice Harlan would not have confined the 
Act to instances of voter registration per se. He would have 
interpreted it to cover "the change of any . procedure 
that prevents the voter from having his ballot finally 
counted .... " 393 U.S. at 589-90 n. 7~ see §14(c) (1) of the 
Act. Another formulation of his view, id. at 591 is: 
"Section 5, then would properly be read to require federal 
approval only of those state laws that change either voter 
qualifications or the manner in which elections are conducted. 
Justice Harlan agreed with the Court that voting 
changes proposed in three of the four companion cases came 
within the scope of §5. He agreed that pre-clearance was 
16. 
required in Whitley v. Williams (new qualifications on 
independent voters who wish to nominate a candidate, and 
change in manner in which such nominations are made)~ Bunton 
v. Patterson (change that made the office of school 
superintendent appointive rather than elective) (Justice Harlan 
considered this a close question because the new voting 
qualification, which in effect disqualified all voters, could 
perhaps not be considered a qualification since there would be 
no vote, but he concluded "on balance" that it should come 
within §5)~ and Allen itself (change in the manner of 
processing illiterate voters at the polls). It was only in 
Fairley v. Patterson, which involved a state statute that 
allowed counties to place their election of Boards of 
Supervisors on an at-large basis, that Justice Harlan 
dissented. See 393 U.S. at 592-93. This was because the 
change from single-member district to at-large voting does not 
affect the right of any voter to cast his ballot and have it 
3 
counted. 
I have engaged in this lengthy narration of Justice 
Harlan's analysis because it seems to me to clarify an 
3. Justice Harlan also registered a practical objection: 
"Moreover, it is not clear to me how a court would 
go about deciding whether an at-large system is to be 
preferred to a district system. Under one system, 
Negroes have some influence in the election of all 
officers~ under the other, minority groups have more 
influence in the election of fewer officers. If 
courts cannot intelligently compare such 
alternatives, it should not e readily inferred that 
Congress has required them to undertake the task." 
393 u.s. at 586 (emphasis in original) . 
important point about what Perkins and Allen did not do, 
insofar as they are relevant to the issue in the instant 
17. 
case. If one accepts Justice Harlan's analysis, it becomes 
plain that Perkins and Allen did not turn congressional intent 
to correct abuses in the registration process into a carte 
blanche for federal review of all local electoral changes. 
Even under Justice Harlan's analysis, the statute is not 
limited to registration per se. Thus Sheffield cannot 
legitimately make the argument that Congress was concerned 
only with registration and therefore sought only to subject to 
pre-clearance those changes effected by the registering body 
itself. Under Alabama law, as noted above, local governments 
have the authority to do the sort of thing that Justice Harlan 
viewed as within the ambit of §5, such as moving polling 
places, Code of Ala.,. Title 37, §34(24); see Perkins, supra; 
and the kind of thing the majority held to be within the scope 
of §5, such as altering district lines. Code of Ala., Title 
37, §34(23). Many of the other aspects of local elections are 
governed by state legislation in Alabama, but it is 
theoretically possible that any or all of these functions 
could be delegated to localities by state law. 
The point is that the Court's departure from a strict 
construction of the Act - which would have limited it to 
changes in core registration rules (which departure was 
concurred in by all but Mr. Justice Black, who in any event 
continued to hold to the view expressed in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, that the whole of §5 is unconstitutional) -
destroyed the congruence between the coverage definition and 
the substantive reach of the Act. With that in mind, it 
becomes clear that the SG wins no matter which of two possible 
views one takes of the legislative history. 
If one starts with Sheffield's view that Congress was 
concerned only with registration and those who conduct it, 
then it follows that under the broader construction of the 
substantive reach of the Act (whether Mr. Justice Harlan's 
ballot-access view or the broader dilution-of-minority-
voting-power view of the majority}, Congress would have been 
concerned with those who effect such changes. (The analysis 
is similar to the one suggested in the bank venue case: we 
apply the underlying congressional purpose to a changed 
situation, despite the narrower language chosen by Congress 
when it was thinking of a narrower application of the broad 
principle.} As long as Perkins and Allen are good law, or 
even if Justice Harlan's narrower view were accepted, 
congressional intent - as perceived and implemented by the 
Court - would be frustrated by a literal reading of the 
language. 
If, on the other hand, one were to view the 
legislative history more favorably to the SG, his case would 
be even stronger. The SG cites items of legislative history 
that indicate that Congress was thinking of electoral changes 
at and by the local levels of government when it passed the 
Act. I am not sure how persuasive this evidence is, and it 
seems to me that Congress' choice of definition of "political 
subdivision" negates the view that it was thinking of 




by Senator Tallmadge, in which he explained his opposition to 
the bills in terms of the effect §5 would have on all sorts of 
local electoral changes. But Sheffield points out that cities 
in Georgia (the Senator's state) do conduct voter 
registration. The SG counters by asserting that in 1965, 
cities and counties in Georgia shared authority to register 
voters, as is the case in Mississippi, see the SG's brief at 
17 n. 11, so that cities in Georgia cannot be considered 
political subdivisions within the meaning of the Act. In my 
opinion, that point is as wrong with respect to Georgia as it 
is with respect to Mississippi. See p. 8 n. 1, supra. 
The SG thus finds little direct support in the 
legislative history for the proposition that changes by 
non-registering units are subject to § 5. But the legislative 
history can be construed to include local elections and 
electoral changes, and it was so construed in Perkins and 
Allen. To the extent that the SG's position derives as a 
logical necessity from those decisions, it therefore is 
well-grounded in the legislative history. As discussed above, 
the conclusion gains its support from the practical point of 
view that localities should not be able to effect changes in 
local elections in cases in which the state or political 
subdivision of which the locality is a part could not so 
legislate for the locality without pre-clearance. 
2. Subsequent developments 
The SG can find much more support for his view in the 
legislative history of the 1970 and 1975 amendments to the 
Voting Rights Act than in the legislative history of the Act 
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itself. Here the SG's position is irrefutable. In the 
debates on extension of the Act, both the House and Senate 
reports cited voting changes by municipalities and school 
districts that diluted minority voting power as examples of 
practices to be remedied. Proponents and opponents alike 
assumed that changes by localities were subject to § 5. 
Debate concerned whether elections at the local level were 
proper subjects of federal supervision, and the proponents of 
extension of the Act obviously won. 
Furthermore, submissions to the Attorney General by 
local units were cited in the debates. It is not even 
necessary to give independent force, as the SG urges the Court 
to do, to the Attorney General's consistent interpretation of 
§ 5 to include non-registering political units. See the SG's 
brief at 26-28. It is enough to say that Congress was aware 
of the Attorney' General's construction of the Act when it 
extended it in 1970 and 1975. 
E. Summary 
This is a hard case, because in order to rule in the 
SG's favor, the Court must say that the Act means something 
other than what it says. Further, it is hard to argue in this 
case that the statutory language is ambiguous on its face. My 
agreement with the SG is not based on policy considerations, 
because I have no strong views about whether changes in local 
electoral practices should be subject to federal 
pre-clearance. There is great force to Justice Black's views 
on the matter, and I take it that you share them to some 
extent. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
• 
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But I am left with the feeling that Congress could 
not have intended to let a state accomplish, by means of 
delegation of certain responsibilities with regard to local 
elections, what it could not accomplish directly without 
submitting such changes for federal pre-clearance. The only 
difference between state-wide legislation dealing with local 
elections and legislation by localities for themselves is the 
breadth of effect of the proposed change. The effect on 
individual voters in a particular locality would be the same. 
Besides, as far as I know, state legislatures need not always 
adopt state-wide measures; they can legislate for particular 
localities as well. In such cases there would be no 
~I 
difference at all. When I add to these thoughts the 
Court's decisions in Perkins and Allen; Congress' acquiescence 
in the Allen decision when it enacted the 1970 extensions of 
the Act, see Georgia v. United States, supra, 411 u.s. at 533; 
and Congress' further extension of the Act in 1975 after 
debates that contained references to local elections, all 
factors--except the statute's literal language--point in favor 
of the SG's view. 
Of course, a ruling adhering to the language of the 
statute would make Congress state exactly what it means, and 
make its tacit acceptance of the SG's view explicit. But an 
4 The only arguable difference is that the state, not the 
locality, has been designated under § 5. The local 
legislature that wants to adopt the new voting requirement is 
not the "culprit". But the same would be true of a political 
subdivision that had not been designated separately, yet 
Sheffield does not argue that a change by a political 
subdivision that was not designated separately would not be 
subject to pre-clearance . 
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adoption of Sheffield's position really would be a statement 
that the Court thinks Congress did not mean to reach elections 
at levels of government more local than those large enough to 
conduct their own registration; and I doubt that this is what 
Congress meant. My tentative recommendation on this point 
therefore would be to reverse. 
III. Did the Attorney General In Fact 
Approve the Voting Change at Issue? 
Neither party devotes much attention to this 
question. The Attorney General did not object to the holding 
of a referendum to decide whether to change from a commission 
form of government to a mayor/city council form. The Attorney 
General specifically stated that further clearance would be 
required for actual implementation of the change. Sheffield 
contends, and the court below held (with one judge dissenting 
on this point), that the Attorney General's approval of the 
referendum constituted approval of the ultimate change in the 
form of Sheffield's government. 
The court so held because Alabama law contains 
mandatory requirements for the manner of electing council 
members. Code of Ala., Title 37, § 426 requires, inter alia, 
that members of a city council in a city of Sheffield's size 
be elected at large. (It was the election of council members 
to which the Attorney General ultimately objected.) The court 
below held that since the Attorney General was charged with 
knowledge of this provision of Alabama law, he knew that 
at-large election of council members would be instituted if 




Sheffield's theory would persuade me but for two 
points. First, the letter from Sheffield to the Attorney 
General, requesting pre-clearance to hold the referendum, did 
not mention § 426. I would not imagine that the Attorney 
General is held to constructive knowledge of every provision 
of every state's election laws. Second, even if the Attorney 
General was aware of § 426, there existed other information, 
not in the Attorney General's possession at the time he 
approved the referendum, necessary to a determination whether 
to approve or object to the change. After the referendum the 
Attorney General requested and Sheffield provided various 
demographic data on which the Attorney General based his 
ultimate objection. Especially considering the explicit 
caveat in the Attorney General's initial letter to Sheffield, 
indicating that implementing the change also would require 
pre-clearance, I would not hold that he in effect approved the 
change when he approved the referendum. 
I am not sure why Sheffield even requested clearance 
to hold the referendum. The city leaders might have wanted to 
know that the ultimate change could take place before deciding 
to find out whether the people of Sheffield wanted it to take 
place. Similarly, it is conceivable that the Attorney 
General's office figured it need not request and analyze the 
demographic data until it was clear that Sheffield intended, 
as a result of the referendum, to change its form of 
government. Each party's view (according to my speculation) 
was understandable. As a matter of fact, however, the 
·' 
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referendum already had taken place when the Attorney General 
acted upon Sheffield's letter. (It had not taken place when 
the Attorney General received the letter.) 
Given all of the above, I would not recommend 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
Give11 the Court's reading of the Voting Rights Act in prior 
decisions. a.ncl particularly in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 
393 U.S. 544 (1969). and Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 
(1971) . I concur in the judgment of the Court. In addition, 
I concur in Part III of the Court's opinion. 
Although my reservations as to the constitutionality of the 
Act have not abated.* I believe today's decision to be correct 
under this Court's precedents and necessary in order to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act. as construed in Allen a1H1 
Perkins. In view of these purposes it does not make sense 
to limit the preclearance requirement to political units charged 
with voter registration. As the majority observes. ante, at 13. 
such a construction of the statute could enable covered States 
or political subdivisions to allow local entities that do not 
conduct voter registration to assume responsibility for chang-
ing the electoral process. A covered State or political sub-
division thereby could achieve through its instrumentalities 
'vhat it could not do itself without preclearance. 
I agree with the Court that a more sensible construction of 
~ 5. in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose. is to 
treat the governmental units responsible for changes in the 
·*See Alten v. State Board of Elections. supra, nt 595 (Black, .T .. dissent.-
l.ng) ~ Georg,iro v.. U.S.., 411 U.S. 526,, 545 (1973) (PowELL, J., di~senting)_ 
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electoral process within a designated Sta.te or political sub-· 
division as the equivalent of the Sta.te or political subdivision. 
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding, 
cited by the District Court. that the desiguatiou of a State 
would imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In 
such a situation, the reason for including the political sub-
divisions is not that they are defined in ~ 14 (c) ( 2) and there-
fore might have been designated separately. Their eligibility 
for designation apart from the State is without significa11ce 
once the entire State has been designated. Rather, the politi-
cal subdivisions are covered because they are within the .i uris-
diction of the designated unit and might be delegated its 
authority to enact or administer laws affecting voting. 
Because the same is true of a governmental unit like the city 
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the 
meaning of§ 14 (c)(2) , I agree with the Court that it too is 
subject to 8 5 and must comply with its requirements; 
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MR. Jrs'l'ICB PowELL, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
Given tlw Court's reading of the Voting Rights Act in prior 
decisions. and particularly in Allen v. State Boa.rd of Elections, 
393 l T. fi. 544 ( H)60). and Pm~kins v. Matthews, 400 C S. 379 
(1971 ), I concur in the judgment of the Court. Jn addition. 
I concur in Part [JJ of the Court's opinion. 
Although my res<>rvations as to the constitutionality of the 
Act have not abated.* T beliPve toclay 's decision to be conect 
under this Court's precedents and nPcessary i 11 onlt>r to pffec-
tuate tlH' purposes of the Act. as construed in Allen and 
Perkins. Tn view <)f these purposes it does not make s<>nse 
to limit tlw 1)1'eclrarance requirement to political units eharged 
with \'OLPr n'gistration . As the majority observes. rwle, at 13. 
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or political subdi visi{)I}S to allo;v local entities that do not 
eonclu<'t voter registration to assume responsibility for <'hang-
ing the electoral process. A covered State or political sub-
divisiOil thereby eoulJ achieve through its instrumentalities 
wha.t it eoulcl nol do itst-lf without preclearance. 
*See Allen v. Sta.te Boatel of Elrctions. supra, at 595 (Black, .T., dis,.'Cnt.-
ing) ; Georgia "· U. S., 411 U. S. 526, 545 ( 1973) (PowJo;LL, .T., dis;;enting) . 
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I agree with the Court that a more sensible constJ-uction of 
§ 5, in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose, is to 
trea,t the governmental units responsible for changes iu the 
electoral process within a. designated Sta.te or political sub-
divjsion as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision. 
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding, 
cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State 
wotJld imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In 
such a situation, th~ reason for including the political sub-
divisions is not that they are defined in § 14 (c)(2) aod there-
fore might have been d~signated separately. Their eligibility 
for designation apart from the State is without significance 
once the entire State has been designated. ' Rather, the politi-
cal subdlvisions are covered because they are within the juris-
diction of the designated unit and might be delegated its 
authority to enact or administer laws affecting voting. 
Because the same is true of a governmental unit like the city 
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the 
meaning of§ 14 (c)(2), I agree with the Court that it too~ 




As requested by the Court, the SG has submitted his d 
views. He takes a middle posi~ion. He agrees that the DC ~4~ 
did not err in refusing t o set aside the 1976 election or to 
"unstagger" the terms immediately b~ ordering that all three • 
seats stand for election in 1978. 1he change in voting procedures ~ 
effected by the 1968 law are not necessarily discriminatory, and .1~ 
they might have been enacted for perfectly good reasons. The~se ~ 
are matters t~~ only can be determined by clearing the law thr h 
§5 procedures. , , 
Bu t t he DC's order, which simply enjoined enforcement of ~ 
the 1968 law until it is cleared through §5, did not go quite 
far enough, beca'Use it "did not direct any affirmative steps to 
achieve compliance with" §5. Therefore, the SG submits: 
"[T]he district court should be directed to enter an order 
allowing the appellees a short specific time period - we 
suggest 30 days - within which to apply, by one procedure 
or the other, for clearance of the 1968 change under Section 5. 
If the change is cleared, no further action would be required. 
If it is not cleared, appellants should then be permitted to 
renew their request for election of all three members at the 
same time." Br. for U.S. at 8. 
Discussion: As I understand the DC injunction, the election 
for Post 3 that is scheduled for this year cannot take place until 
the 1968 law has beep cleared through §5. Thus, there already is 
some pressure on the county to clear the 1968 law. It is unclear 
what would happen if the 1968 law is not cleared and the 1978 election 
is not held. The incumbant of Post 3 might just remain in office, 
in which case any discriminatory effects resulting from the 1968 
law could continue indefinitely. This may be what the SG is concerned 
about. In order to alleviate that concern, it may be appropriate 
to adopt the SG's recommended dispos~:ion. rJo ~~ . 
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tuate the purposes of the Act. as construed in Allen and 
Perkins. In view of these purposes it does not make sense 
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conduct voter registration to assume responsibility for chang-
ing the electoral process. A covered State or political sub-
division thereby could achieve through its instrumentalities 
what it could not do itself without preclearance. 
I agree with the Court that a more sensible construction of 
§ 5, in view of and in accord with the statute's purpose, is to 
treat the governmental units responsible for changes in the 
electoral process within a designated State or political sub ... 
division as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision. 
This construction also accords with Congress' understanding, 
cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State 
would imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In 
such a situation. the reason for including the political sub-
divisions is not that they are defined in§ 14 (c) (2) 'and there-
fore might have been designated separately. Their eligibility 
for designation apart from the State is without significance 
once the entire State has been designated. Rather, the politi-
cal subdivisions are covered because they are within the juris-
diction of the designated unit and might be delegated its 
at~thority to enact or administer laws affecting voting. 
l3ecause the same is true of a governmental unit like the city 
of Sheffield that is not a "political subdivision" within the 
meaning of § 14 (c) (2), I agree with the Court that it too is 
subject to § 5 and must compl,y with its requirements. 
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